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FINANCIAL POLICY

1 IN TRO D U CTIO N
A PRO -PO O R G RO W TH A PPRO A CH TO FIN A N CIA L PO LICY

This module describes the current state ofknow ledge w ith respect to
pro-poor grow th financial policies.1 These policies are presented as
alternatives to w hat, w e argue, are the failed financial policies inspired
by orthodox economics. O rthodox financial policies, also know n as
‘W ashington Consensus’ policies, have been implemented in a large
number ofdeveloping countries over the last quarter century. W e explore
the logic ofthese financial policies and examine the diverse w ays in w hich
they have failed the developing w orld.

“Dom estic financial
liberalization has
unam biguously failed
to deliverm ostofthe
rew ards claim ed by
its proponents”.

The principal goals ofthis module are to present a range offinancial
policies that have been utilized in some countries to promote pro-poor
grow th at various times, and also to present a set ofmore innovative
policies that have not yet been utilized, but w hich w e argue can also
support pro-poor grow th. W e maintain, in fact, that there exists a w ealth
ofsuch experiences and strategies available to practitioners in the
developing w orld.
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1.1 A BRIEF REVIEW O F H ISTO RICAL EXPERIEN CE
Ifthe 1950s and 1960s w ere the ‘golden age’ ofcapitalism in the industrialized w orld, then in much
ofthe developing w orld, this period should be remembered as the age ofthe ‘developmental state’
[Marglin and Schor, 1990;W ade, 1990;Amsden, 2001]. In many parts ofthe developing w orld,
especially those that had recently w on independence from colonial pow ers, the state w as seen as a
general agent ofeconomic development. Its prescribed tasks included mobilizing and directing
savings for industrialization;using industrial and trade policy (including tariffs) to guide investment
and industrial development;implementing financial market regulations (including capital and
exchange controls) to marshal domestic and international financial resources for domestic
investment and to manage the country's relations w ith the international markets;and using
government ow nership ofgiven financial and industrial firms to control the rate and direction of
investment, to generate employment and to address various social problems, such as poverty [e.g.,
N embhard, 1996;W oo-Cumings, 1999]. Many developing countries, such as India, Brazil, Argentina,
Taiw an PO C, Republic ofKorea, Singapore, South Africa and Ghana, used such diverse types of
policies to industrialize and to promote economic grow th and improvements in living standards.
In the area offinance, many developing country states w ere especially active. These countries
w ere taking a leaffrom Alexander Gerschenkron's famous thesis that ‘late developers’ had to make
use ofspecial financial institutions to mobilize and channel savings for long-term investment and
grow th because ofthe scale and complexity involved in catching up to global leaders
[Gerschenkron, 1962]. Moreover, significant involvement by the state in the area offinance w as in
keeping w ith the general tenor ofthe times, w hich had perceived the calamitous role ofprivate
finance in the disastrous collapse ofthe w orld economy in the 1930s [H elleiner, 1994;Kindleberger,
1973]. D uring this period, a variety ofstate-ow ned, state-regulated or state-directed financial
institutions w ere created to mobilize and channel credit to agricultural and industrial sectors ofthe
economy, as w ell as to important social sectors such as housing and education.
Significantly, these policies ofstate management and direction offinance w ere used w idely
not only in many developing countries, but also in the developed w orld [Zysman, 1983]. In
countries w ith economic systems as diverse as those in Japan, France, the U nited States and
Germany, financial regulations and state-ow ned or state-directed banks w ere used for a range of
economic and social purposes, including subsidizing housing, supporting industrial policy and
export promotion, promoting small businesses and financing infrastructure development
[Pollin, 1995;Grabel, 1997;Epstein, 2006].
In the era ofthe developmental state, central banks in developing countries often cooperated
w ith or w ere under the control ofgovernments. These ‘developmental central banks’ supported
the state's developmental goals through a variety oftools and mechanisms, including subsidizing
credit and regulating financial institutions to direct credit to specific purposes [Bloomfield, 1957;
Brimmer, 1971]. In fact, as a marker ofthe times, many ofthese developmental central banks w ere
established w ith the help and advice ofthe N ew York Federal Reserve, w hich today w ould arguably
have no part ofsuch advice [H elleiner, 2003]. This type ofcentral bank practice, ofcourse, contrasts
radically w ith today’s orthodox vision ofcentral banks, institutions that are exhorted to be
politically independent ofgovernments and to focus primarily, ifnot exclusively, on keeping
inflation in the low single digits.
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As prominent Federal Reserve economist and historian Arthur Bloomfield noted:
“Many ofthe central banks, especially those established since 1945 w ith the help ofFederalReserve advisers
(emphasis added) are characterized by unusually w ide and flexible pow ers. A large number ofinstruments of
general and selective credit control, some ofa novel character, are provided for. Pow ers are given to the
central bank to engage in a w ide range ofcredit operations w ith commercial banks and in some cases w ith
other financial institutions… These and other pow ers w ere specifically provided in the hope ofenabling the
central banks… to pursue a more purposive (emphasis added) and effective monetary policy than had been
possible for most… that had been set up… during the tw enties and thirties… w hich permitted little scope
for a monetary policy designed to prom ote econom ic developm entand internalstability (emphasis added)… ”
[Bloomfield, 1957, p. 191].

It w as a sign ofthe times, then, that even the U .S. Federal Reserve System w as helping
developing countries create developmental central banks.
As w e discuss in the next section, the post-w ar vision ofdevelopmental central banking and
financial policies in the service ofpro-poor grow th fell out offashion as part ofthe general
reassertion oforthodox economic theory and policy in the mid-to-late 1970s. In the financial arena,
the reassertion oforthodox economics w as embodied in the adoption ofpolicies ofinternal and
external financial liberalization, the creation ofindependent central banks and the use ofinflation
targeting [on the latter, see Saad Filho, 2006;Epstein, 2002, 2005].
W e w ill see that these orthodox policies have been associated w ith reductions in inflation
relative to its high levels in the 1980s. But these same policies have also been associated w ith
serious pathologies:recurrent financial crises (e.g., in Turkey in 1992, Mexico in 1994, East Asia in
1997 and Argentina in 2001);major increases in domestic and, by some measures, in global
inequality [Milanovic, 2005];slow er economic grow th and even stagnation in some parts ofthe
w orld, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa;and increases in unemployment or underemployment
in many parts ofthe developing w orld. In view ofthese failures, the time is ripe to consider new
approaches to domestic, central bank and external financial policies.

1.2 PRIN CIPLES O F FIN AN CIAL PO LICIES FO R PRO -PO O R GRO W TH
Before w e consider policy alternatives, w e have to answ er the follow ing question:W hat do w e
mean by pro-poor grow th financial policies? At one level, this is quite easy to answ er. W e w ill
describe policies and institutions that are designed to mobilize and channel savings, allocate credit
in accordance w ith identified social and economic objectives, and promote financial and
macroeconomic stability w ith the goal ofpromoting grow th that w ill generate employment,
income and w ealth for the poor.
To achieve these outcomes, financial policies have to serve general purposes, as w ell as
specific purposes related to the needs ofparticular countries and regions. More precisely, the
financial sector can play an important and productive role in promoting pro-poor grow th through
the follow ing channels:
•

Mobilize savings for productive investment and employment generation;

•

Create credit for employment generation and poverty reduction at modest and stable
real interest rates;
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•

Allocate credit for employment generation and help the poor to build assets, including
in agriculture, in small- and medium-sized enterprises and in housing;

•

Provide patient (long-term) credit for productivity-enhancing innovation and
investment;

•

Provide financing for public investment to provide for employment generation and
productivity enhancement;

•

H elp to allocate risks to those w ho can most easily and efficiently bear such risks;

•

H elp to stabilize the economy by reducing vulnerability to financial crises and procyclical movements in finance, and by helping to maintain moderate rates ofinflation;

•

H elp the poor by providing basic financial and banking services.

1.3 GO ALS AN D O RGAN IZATIO N O F TH E MO D U LE
The chiefgoal ofthis Training Module is to describe how the diverse parts ofthe financial sector
(namely, the domestic and external sectors and the central bank) can play the roles described
above. In section 2 ofthis module w e describe the logic and the (failed) performance ofthe
financial policies inspired by orthodox economic theory. In section 3 w e present a snapshot ofthe
problematic state ofthe financial environment in developing countries today. Sections 4-6 are the
heart ofthis module insofar as they present a range offinancial policies that can be used to
promote pro-poor grow th. Section 4 presents policies for the domestic financial sector, section 5
policies for developmental central banks, and section 6 policies tow ard external financial flow s.

2 O RTH O D O X A PPRO A CH ES TO FIN A N CIA L PO LICY
IN D EV ELO PIN G CO U N TRIES
H aving made a case for pro-poor financial policy above, w e now consider an alternative logic that
w e term the orthodox view . The orthodox view has driven the financial policy decisions made in
most (but not all) developing and w ealthy countries over the last quarter century. There are many
reasons for the shift tow ard orthodox financial policies. These include advocacy on the part ofthe
U .S. and U .K. governments and ofthe Bretton W oods and other multilateral institutions;
w idespread acceptance oforthodox economic theory;increased pow er and autonomy ofthe
financial sector both globally and nationally;and the attempt by policymakers in developing
countries to use open financial markets as magnets for international capital flow s.
In this section, w e explain the theoretical basis ofthe orthodox case for liberalization
(i.e., deregulation) ofthe domestic financial sector and ofinternational capital flow s. Although in
practice they are often treated together, w e discuss these tw o dimensions ofliberalization
separately in sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, for the sake ofclarity. N ote that the reduction of
poverty is not central to the orthodox case for financial liberalization. N evertheless, liberalization
is seen to benefit the poor through numerous channels. In section 2.3 w e w ill briefly review the
performance ofthe financial reforms inspired by the orthodox view . W e w ill see that this policy
has failed to achieve its chiefgoals and that it has aggravated critical problems (such as poverty,
inequality and instability). These failures stand in sharp contrast to the limited successes that can
be attributed to financial liberalization, as w e w ill also see.
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2.1 TH E O RTH O D O X CASE FO R LIBERALIZATIO N O F TH E D O MESTIC FIN AN CIAL SECTO R 2
O rthodox economists maintain that w hen state regulation ofdomestic finance w as the norm—
from the end ofW W II until the mid-to-late 1970s—it w as counterproductive. Today, such policies
continue to be seen as counterproductive in the few developing countries that remain committed
to active state involvement in finance. O rthodox economists use the ideologically-charged term
‘financial repression’ to describe financial systems that are actively regulated in accordance w ith
state development goals. Such systems tend to be dominated by banks w hose decisions are
influenced by governments, rather than by capital (i.e., stock and bond) markets.
In the orthodox view , active state involvement in the financial sectorhas a numberofadverse
consequences. The maintenance oflow interest rates (particularly in the context ofhigh inflation)
encourages domestic savers to hold funds abroad and makes current consumption more attractive
than saving in domestic financial institutions. H igh levels ofconsumerspending can put upw ard
pressure on prices and thereby aggravate inflationary pressures. Low savings rates also mean that
domestic banks have an insufficient pool ofsavings from w hich to extend loans. The level ofdomestic
investment is thus compromised by active financial regulation, and employment and economic grow th
sufferaccordingly. It is through employment, grow th and price channels that orthodox economists
maintain that state involvement in finance negatively affects living standards and poverty.
Furthermore, orthodox economists contend that active state involvement in finance
fragments domestic financial markets, w ith only a small segment ofpolitically-connected
borrow ers gaining access to scarce low -cost credit. D isenfranchised borrow ers must either resort to
unregulated ‘informal’ (or ‘curb’) lenders, w ho often charge exorbitant interest rates, or otherw ise
manage in the face oftheir unmet needs for capital. Entrepreneurship, employment-creation and
grow th therefore suffer. These negative effects are disproportionately experienced by the poor
since the burden ofscarce credit hits them hardest. They rarely have access to alternative, low ercost sources ofcredit, such as the finance available on international capital markets.
In view ofthe above, orthodox economists argue that developing countries must liberalize
their domestic financial systems. A liberalized financial system w ith a competitive capital market is
seen as central to the promotion ofhigh levels ofsavings, investment, employment, productivity,
foreign capital inflow s and grow th. From this perspective, liberalized systems serve the interests of
the poor and the disenfranchised (as w ell as other groups) by increasing access to capital, w ith
attendant benefits for employment, investment and grow th.
O rthodox economists also maintain that domestic financial liberalization increases not only
the level ofinvestment, but also its quality (i.e., its efficiency) by allocating funds across investment
projects according to rate-of-return criteria and via w hat are seen as objective or ‘arms-length’
practices. D omestic financial liberalization is seen to improve the overall efficiency ofthe financial
system by eliminating the w asteful and corrupt practices that flourish under financial regulation, as
w ell as by subjecting borrow ers and firm managers to market discipline. Market discipline and
reduced corruption improve the operating performance offinancial institutions and consequently
enhance the prospects for financial stability.
In the orthodox view , liberalization has other benefits. It encourages the creation ofnew
financial instruments (e.g., derivatives) and ofmarkets in w hich to trade them. This is termed
financial innovation. Investment and financial stability are promoted by new opportunities to
diversify and disperse risk. By increasing the availability offinance, liberalization also eliminates the
need for informal finance, w hich often exploits the poor, and allow s borrow ers to utilize the forms
offinance that are most appropriate to their investment projects.
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O rthodox economists see the finance provided through capital markets as preferable to bank
loans because it is understood to have a greater ability to disperse risk, is allocated according to
objective efficiency and performance criteria, is cheaper than other forms ofexternal finance (such
as bank loans) and is highly liquid. The liquidity attribute is considered especially desirable because
it places firm managers under the threat ofinvestor exit (or higher capital costs) ifthey underperform. (See section 2.2 for further discussion.) The promotion ofinternationally-integrated capital
markets has the added benefit offacilitating the rapid integration ofdeveloping countries into the
global financial system.
Some orthodox economists argue that full domestic financial liberalization can be attained
only once other sectors ofthe economy (such as tradable goods and labour markets) are w ell
functioning and liberalized. This is know n as the sequencing view . H ow ever, many orthodox
economists reject arguments for sequencing because ofthe problems introduced by this strategy
(such as the possibility that it gives time for interest groups to mobilize to block liberalization).
D espite the debate about the speed and sequencing ofliberalization among some orthodox
economists, there is no dispute among them that a liberalized domestic financial sector is the ideal
to be attained by developing countries.

2.2 TH E O RTH O D O X CASE FO R LIBERALIZATIO N O F IN TERN ATIO N AL CAPITAL FLO W S
In the orthodox view , there are numerous benefits associated w ith unfettered international private
capital flow s. O pen capital markets give the public and private sectors access to capital and other
resources (such as technology) that are not being generated domestically. Sufficient capital and
other resources are not generated domestically because oflow income, savings and grow th and
capital flight. Thus, orthodox economists maintain that an increase in private capital inflow s w ill
inaugurate a virtuous cycle by increasing a nation’s capital stock, productivity, investment,
economic grow th and employment. All ofthese benefits redound to the advantage ofsociety as a
w hole, and particularly to that ofthe poor, since higher levels ofinvestment increase overall
employment opportunities, especially in the modern, technologically advanced firms that are
financed by foreign investment. Likew ise, the sale ofgovernment bonds to foreign investors
increases the resources available for public expenditure, resources that are often scarce due to tax
collection problems and the myriad demands on budgets. The poor w ill also benefit ifthe new
spending is oriented in their direction.
O rthodox economists also argue that international private capital flow s increase efficiency
and policy discipline. The need to attract private capital flow s and the threat ofcapital flight (by
domestic and foreign investors) are pow erful incentives for the government and firms to maintain
international standards for ‘good policy,’ macroeconomic performance and corporate governance.
Specifically, orthodox economists maintain that governments seeking to attract international
private capital flow s are more likely to pursue anti-inflationary policies and anti-corruption
measures because foreign investors value price stability, transparency and the rule oflaw . The poor
benefit from stable prices and transparency since they are less able than the rich to hedge against
inflation or extract benefits from corrupt regimes.
Liberalization ofinternational capital flow s means that a greater proportion oftotal financial
flow s w ill be allocated by capital markets or foreign banks that are not influenced by developing
country governments. In the orthodox view , this shift in the allocation mechanism increases
efficiency and ensures that finance is directed tow ards projects that promise the greatest net
contribution to social w elfare. These are the projects promising the highest rates ofreturn. H ere,
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too, there is an assumed benefit to the poor as they stand equal to the rich and the politically
connected in the competition for capital in internationally integrated markets.
For the reasons advanced above, orthodox economists hold that liberalization ofcapital flow s
is essential to promote sound economic performance, particularly w ith regard to investment and
grow th. Indeed, had the East Asian financial crisis of1997-98 not intervened, the IMF w as poised to
modify Article 6 ofits Articles ofAgreement to make the liberalization ofinternational private
capital flow s a central purpose ofthe Fund and to extend its jurisdiction to capital movements.
Similarly w ith respect to domestic financial liberalization, some orthodox economists argue
that the liberalization ofinternational capital flow s (especially the most liquid ofthese) should be
undertaken only aftersuccessful liberalization ofother sectors or the attainment ofsufficient
institutional and regulatory capacity. Advocates ofsequencing generally find their case
strengthened follow ing financial crises because these are held to be a consequence ofpremature
external financial liberalization. N otably, follow ing the East Asian crisis, some studies, even by IMF
staff, acknow ledged that certain techniques for managing international capital flow s can prevent
undue financial volatility, provided that capital management techniques are temporary and that the
rest ofthe economy is liberalized [e.g., Prasad, Rogoff, W ei, Kose, 2003;Kuczynski and W illiamson,
2003]. N ote that even among advocates ofsequencing, there is no question that complete
liberalization is the ultim ate goalfor alldeveloping countries.

2.3 TH E PERFO RMAN CE O F LIBERALIZED FIN AN CIAL SYSTEMS
Financial liberalization has been the norm in developing countries in the last quarter century.
The policy has enjoyed a few successes and suffered numerous unambiguous failures.
O n the positive side ofthe balance sheet, liberalization has furthered the integration of
developing countries into global markets. This has meant that certain large firms, especially in the
context ofprivatization programs, have received significant finance through the internationally
integrated capital markets created or expanded follow ing financial liberalization. The finance
provided to these firms has often been cheaper than that available via bank loans.
Counterfactually, it is at least plausible to assume that the investment levels offirms that have
gained access to new pools offinance have probably been higher than they w ould have been in
the absence ofliberalization. Financial liberalization has meant that governments have been able
to raise (i.e., borrow ) funds on international capital markets. Middle-class consumers may also have
benefited from access to international credit markets and from the opportunity to diversify their
portfolios internationally. Finally, the higher interest rates associated w ith financial liberalization,
together w ith the adoption ofinflation targeting programs, have helped to low er rates ofinflation
in developing countries.
H ow ever, even these achievements are not w ithout complications. The grow th oflarge firms
(and the contraction ofsmall firms that cannot afford to borrow at high interest rates) has
increased business concentration. The low er-cost capital that has become available to certain
large firms after financial liberalization has fuelled speculative bubbles in many countries.
Moreover, capital markets reinforce rather than undermine existing dualisms characterized by
greater access to low er-cost external finance by large firms. There is no evidence that the grow th
ofcapital markets increases access to finance or low ers its cost for those entrepreneurs w ho have
long faced severe capital constraints.
Indeed, as McKinley notes, follow ing financial liberalization, commercial banks have
concentrated their activities in the major urban areas ofdeveloping countries. H e goes on to
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explain that “although aggregate statistics offinancial deepening might have improved follow ing
financial liberalization, access to credit has become, ifanything, more unequal. The rural population
remains deprived ofcredit in most countries, and is likely w orse offcompared to the access to
credit that state-ow ned agricultural banks had previously provided” [p. 21]. McKinley [2005:23]
concludes that, in the African case, the private sector has had even less access to credit after
financial liberalization than before it.
Large foreign-ow ned banks come to play a greaterrole in the domestic financial system
follow ing the removal ofrestrictions on theirpresence. Large foreign-ow ned banks that generally
enterdeveloping countries afterliberalization are not responsive to the needs ofsmall- and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) [see W eller, 2001b]. Interestingly, a study oflarge banks in the U .S.A. finds
that they are less w illing to lend to small firms than are smallerbanks [Bergeret al., 2001]. This finding
should give policymakers in developing countries an additional reason to be cautious w hen
abandoning restrictions on cross-borderand domestic bank mergers as part ofliberalization
programs because this can aggravate the serious financing constraints already faced by SMEs.
There is a large body ofempirical evidence demonstrating that domestic financial
liberalization has unambiguously failed to deliver most ofthe rew ards claimed by its proponents
[e.g., Arestis and D emetriades, 1997;W illiamson and Mahar, 1998;Zhu, Ash and Pollin, 2004, 1998;
Ang and McKibbin, 2005]. D omestic savings have not responded positively to liberalization.
Financial liberalization has not promoted long-term investment in the types ofprojects or sectors
that are central to development and to the amelioration ofsocial ills, such as unemployment,
poverty and inequality. Financial liberalization has created the climate, opportunity and
incentives for investment in speculative activities and has directed the focus to short-term
financial as opposed to long-term developmental returns. Granted, the creation ofa speculative
bubble may temporarily result in an increase in investment and overall economic activity.
H ow ever, an unsustainable and financially fragile environment, or w hat Grabel [1995]terms
‘speculation-led development’, is hardly in the long-term interest ofdeveloping countries. Such
an environment certainly does not improve the situation ofthe poor—indeed it w orsens their
conditions oflife, as w e w ill see.
O ne channel by w hich the speculation-led development induced by financial liberalization
w orsens the condition ofthe poor is through its effect on financial fragility, and ultimately on the
prevalence ofcurrency, banking and overall financial crises. Many empirical studies find that
financial liberalization often leads to currency and banking crises [see Grabel, 2003b, and
references therein]. Chile, Argentina and U ruguay experienced financial collapses follow ing their
experiments w ith liberalization in the mid-1970s. Since then w e have seen financial crises on the
heels ofliberalization in a great many developing countries, such as Russia, N igeria, Jamaica,
Republic ofKorea, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. Contrary to the orthodox view , the
financial innovation and associated increase in liquidity that follow liberalization impart greater risk
and instability to the financial system and the economy. The promotion ofcapital markets—
especially w hen they are internationally integrated and liberalized—exacerbates the problem of
financial fragility that so frequently culminates in crises, the burdens ofw hich alw ays fall
disproportionately on the economically vulnerable and politically w eak groups w ithin society.
Financial liberalization also can w orsen the situation ofthe poor by increasing income and
w ealth inequality and by aggravating existing disparities in political and economic pow er. O nly a
very small proportion ofthe population is situated to exploit the opportunities for speculative gain
available in a liberalized financial environment. Speculation-led development often creates a small
class offinanciers w ho have stronger ties to financial markets abroad than to those in their ow n
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country. It is also associated w ith shifts in political and economic pow er from non-financial to
financial actors [Grabel, 2002;H arvey, 2005;Panitch and Gidgin, 2004;]. In such an environment, the
financial community becomes the anointed arbiter ofthe ‘national interest’ [Grabel, 2003b]. This
means that macroeconomic policies that advance the interests ofthe financial community (such as
those that promote low inflation, high interest rates and fiscal restraint) are justified on the basis
that they serve the broader public interest w hen, in fact, this is rarely the case. Indeed, restrictive
macroeconomic policies have a disproportionately negative effect on the poor and w omen
[Braunstein and H eintz, 2006].
O rthodox economists often herald the disciplining effects ofcapital markets, arguing that the
threat ofinvestor exit and corporate takeovers creates pressure to improve corporate governance.
W e know that the exit and takeover mechanisms are w ell developed in the markets ofthe U .S.A.
and the U .K., but there is simply no evidence to support the argument that these mechanisms have,
on balance, been beneficial. Indeed, numerous studies find that the threat ofinvestor exit shortens
the time horizon ofmanagers, w hile takeovers have increased concentration and induced job
losses. The contention that developing country firms and consumers benefit from the greater
possibility ofexit and takeover is therefore w ithout merit.
It should also be noted that there is no demonstrated empirical or historical relationship
betw een a market-based allocation ofcapital and the satisfaction ofgrow th and social objectives.
This is not surprising since the allocation ofcapital in market-based systems relies on private
financial returns (i.e., profits) as the single yardstick ofinvestment success. The private financial
return on an investment can be quite different from its developmental (or w hat w e might term its
social) return. For example, the developmental return on an investment in the provision ofclean
w ater is likely to exceed its private return. The divergence betw een private and developmental
returns means that alternatives to the market-based allocation ofcapital are necessary to promote
investment that is socially necessary, but not necessarily privately profitable.
Moreover, despite the claims oforthodox economists, a market-based allocation ofcapital is
not a magic cure for inefficiency, w aste and corruption. Liberalization frequently changes the form,
but not the level, ofcorruption or inefficiency. The situation ofRussia after financial liberalization
exemplifies this point, but the country is by no means exceptional in this regard [on Russia, see
Kotz, 1997]. For instance, research on N igeria, Republic ofKorea and South America describes quite
persuasively the corruption that so often flourishes follow ing financial liberalization [Burkett and
D utt, 1991;Chang, 1998;Crotty and Lee, 2004;Lew is and Stein, 1997]. Thus, financial liberalization
does not resolve the problem ofcorruption and the lack oftransparency that frequently operate to
the detriment ofthe poor.
As w ith domestic financial liberalization, the case for liberalizing international capital flow s is
not supported by evidence. N umerous recent cross-country and historical studies demonstrate
conclusively that there is no reliable empirical relationship betw een the liberalization ofcapital
flow s and performance in terms ofinflation, economic grow th or investment in developing
countries [e.g., Eichengreen, 2001;Rodrik, 1998;Lee and Jayadev, 2006]. Moreover, there is now a
large body ofunambiguous empirical evidence that show s that the liberalization ofinternational
private capital flow s is strongly associated w ith banking, currency and financial crises [D emirgücKunt and D etragiache 1998;W eller 2001a].
Studies also show that liberalization is associated w ith increases in poverty and inequality,
though the authors ofthese studies take care to point out that it is difficult to isolate the negative
effects offinancial liberalization from those associated w ith broaderprograms ofeconomic
liberalization (involving, forinstance, the simultaneous adoption oftrade and labourmarket
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liberalization). W ith this caveat it mind, it is w orth noting that W ellerand H ersh [2004]find that
capital and current account liberalization hurt the poorin developing countries in the short run. The
poorare harmed through a chain ofrelated effects that have been established in several studies.
Increased short-term international financial flow s (especially portfolio flow s) are often
associated w ith a greater chance offinancial crisis [Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999;W eller, 2001a],
especially in more liberalized environments [D emirgüc-Kunt and D etragiache, 1999];financial crises
have disproportionately negative consequences for a country’s poor [Baldacci et al., 2002;
Frankenberg, et al., 2002];low -income earners are more likely to be affected by declining demand
as unemployment rises follow ing a financial crisis [Eichengreen, et al., 1996];and the poor are the
first to lose under the fiscal contractions and the last to gain w hen crises subside and fiscal
spending expands [Ravallion, 2002].
Cornia [2003]also finds a good deal ofsuggestive evidence that financial liberalization has a
negative impact on the poor (he also brings together evidence from a variety ofstudies). O fthe six
components ofw hat he terms the “liberal package,” Cornia finds that capital account liberalization
apparently has the strongest impact on w idening w ithin-country inequality. H e finds that the next
most important negative effects on the poor derive from domestic financial liberalization, follow ed
by labour market deregulation and tax reform. Finally, W eisbrot et al. [2001]conclude that there is a
strong prim a facie case that some structural and policy changes implemented during the last tw o
decades, such as financial liberalization, are at least partly responsible for w orsening grow th and
health and other social conditions.
Liberalized financial markets are at least as apt as governments to allocate international capital
flow s in an inefficient, w asteful or developmentally unproductive manner. In many developing
countries, readier access to international flow s follow ing liberalization has financed speculation in
commercial real estate and the stock market, created excess capacity in certain sectors, and
allow ed domestic banks and investors to take on positions ofexcessive leverage, often involving
currency and locational mismatches culminating in crises.
The liberalization ofcapital flow s frequently leads to exchange rate problems that spill over to
other sectors ofthe economy. U nder a system ofmarket-determined (i.e., floating) exchange rates,
large, sudden inflow s ofcapital to a country can pressure the domestic currency to appreciate.
A large appreciation ofthe domestic currency is problematic because it can undermine the
country’s balance ofpayments position. The flipside ofcapital inflow s is, ofcourse, the possibility
ofcapital outflow s (e.g., dividend payments to foreign investors, interest payments to foreign
lenders and the liquidation ofstock portfolios). Sudden, large capital outflow s can pressure the
domestic currency to depreciate.
Capital flight often induces a vicious cycle ofadditional flight and currency depreciation, debtservice difficulties and reductions in stock (or other asset) values. Panicked investors tend to
sell their assets en m asse to avoid the new capital losses brought about by anticipated future
depreciations ofcurrency or asset values [Taylor, 1991]. In this manner, capital flight introduces or
aggravates macroeconomic vulnerabilities and financial instability. This process can culminate in
a financial crisis, an event that seriously compromises economic performance and living standards
(particularly for the poor) and often provides a channel for increased foreign influence over
domestic decision-making.
Finally, on surveying the data, it becomes obvious that international private capital flow s
cannot perform the H erculean tasks assumed by orthodox economists. Before turning to the data,
let us clarify the terminology. International private capital flow s consist offour main types—foreign
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bank lending, portfolio investment (PI), foreign direct investment (FD I) and remittances. Foreign
bank lending refers to the loans extended by commercial banks or multilateral institutions to
domestic public or private sector borrow ers. PI refers to the purchase ofstocks, bonds, derivatives
and other financial instruments issued by the private sector in a country other than that in w hich
the purchaser resides. In the case ofbonds, the instruments can be also be issued by the
government and purchased by private investors.
FD I refers to the purchase ofa ‘controlling interest’ (defined as at least 10 percent ofthe assets)
in a business in a country otherthan that in w hich the investorresides. FD I can take tw o forms:
1) ‘greenfield’ investment, w hich involves the creation ofa new facility, e.g., the construction ofa
factory by a foreign investor;or2) ‘brow nfield’ investment, namely, mergers and acquisitions that
involve the purchase ofassets ofexisting domestic firms. The cross-borderpurchase ofreal estate is
also classified as FD I. Private remittances referto international resource transfers betw een individuals.
The most common type ofremittance occurs w hen a family memberw ho is w orking abroad sends
funds (i.e., w age remittances) to a family memberin the home country.
D ata on international private capital flow s show that despite the grow th ofPI and FD I flow s to
developing countries during the 1990s, their share ofglobal private capital flow s is still small and
remains highly concentrated in a few large countries.3 W ith regard to concentration ofFD I, Brazil,
China, India, Mexico and the Russian Federation received just over 60 per cent ofnet FD I inflow s to
all developing countries in 2004, w hile China accounted for one-third ofthe net FD I inflow s that
w ent to all developing countries. In 2003/2004, low -income countries received about 11 per cent
ofnet FD I and the same percentage ofportfolio equity flow s that w ent to all developing countries.
China, India and South Africa together accounted for 82 per cent ofall portfolio equity flow s that
w ent to developing countries in 2004, w hile China alone accounted for almost 40 per cent ofthe
net PI that w ent to all developing countries.
Inflow s ofprivate remittances are becoming an increasingly important part ofthe financial
landscape in some developing countries and regions. As in the case ofPI and FD I, remittance
inflow s are also highly concentrated w ithin a group ofdeveloping countries. In terms ofthe
dollar value ofremittances, the five main recipient countries are India, Mexico, China, Pakistan
and the Philippines [W orld Bank, 2005]. In 2003 these five countries received almost 84 per cent
ofthe remittances that w ent to all developing countries. In 2004 low -income countries received
35 per cent ofthe remittances that w ent to all developing countries. This concentration means
that the potential ofmany developing countries to harness remittances in the service ofpro-poor
grow th is limited.
There is no reason to expect these trends in the concentration ofinternational private capital
flow s to reverse in the near future. Thus, it is imperative that advocates ofpro-poor financial policy
recognize the importance ofstrategies that both mobilize domestic savings in service ofpro-poor
grow th, and maximize the potential ofinternational private capital flow s received to serve this
agenda. W e consider such mechanisms in sections 4-6 ofthis module.

3 CH A LLEN G ES O F CU RREN T FIN A N CIA L STRU CTU RES
In many developing countries, the financial structures are failing to promote development and
poverty reduction. The same can be said ofthe global financial system. In w hat follow s, w e
highlight six key problems w ith current financial structures in the developing w orld.4
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CH ALLEN GE #1:H IGH REAL IN TEREST RATES AN D W ID E IN TEREST RATE SPREAD S
D espite financial liberalization, interest rate spreads and real interest rates remain very high in a
number ofdeveloping countries. Table 1 show s that in 2003, differences betw een interest rates on
deposits and those on lending w ere extremely high in a number ofpoor countries, w hile in many of
them real interest rates remained above 10 percentage points.
TABLE 1

Interest Rate D ifferentialand RealInterest Rate,2003
Country
Armenia
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Cambodia
Cameroon
CAR
Gabon
Honduras
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Mongolia
Nicaragua
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia

Deposit Interest Rate
2003
6.9
7.8
11.4
2.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
11.5
5.0
6.6
14.0
5.6
3.0
9.8
22.0

Lending Interest Rate
2003
20.8
16.0
17.7
18.5
18.0
18.0
18.0
20.8
19.1
30.5
26.3
15.5
14.5
18.9
40.6

Real Interest Rate
2003
15.5
11.0
11.9
15.9
16.9
14.9
19.4
11.2
14.8
11.8
20.6
9.4
8.3
8.0
17.1

Source:W orld Developm entIndicators 2005. Table 5.7.

Clearly, w ith real interest rates and spreads such as these, the financial intermediation process in
developing countries cannot contribute greatly to real capital formation, and financial intermediation
certainly cannot speak to the needs ofthe poororsmall- and medium-sized businesses.

CH ALLEN GE #2:CRED IT CREATIO N IS TO O LO W
In many poor countries, high spreads and real interest rates are associated w ith relatively low rates
ofcredit creation. Table 2 show s that in low -income countries, including sub-Saharan Africa,
interest rate spreads and the amounts ofcredit available lag behind other regions ofthe w orld,
w here financial conditions are more favourable. In most ofsub-Saharan Africa, domestic credit
creation to the private sector is low er than the 63.7 per cent ofGD P show n because the high rate in
South Africa substantially raises the average for the rest ofthe region (See Tables 2 and 3).
TABLE 2

Perform ance Indicators of FinancialInstitutions,2003

Domestic Credit to the
Private Sector
(% of GDP)
Interest Rate Spreada
(percentage points)

Low-Income
Countries

Sub-Saharan
Africa

South Africa

South Asia

East Asia
and the
Pacific

MiddleIncome
Countries

27.0

63.7

158.2

31.0

123.6

64.2

12.4

12.4

5.2

7.3

5.2

6.3

Sources:McKinley, 2005. W orld Bank, W orld Developm entIndicators 2005, Table 5.5
N ote:‘a’ lending minus deposit rate.
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Table 3 provides country-by-country and country-group information concerning domestic
credit to the private sector overall, and domestic credit from the banking sector to the overall
economy, including the government. For a large number ofcountries and for low income countries
as a w hole, there has been very little increase, and, in many cases, a decrease in the amount of
credit to the private sector and to the economy as a w hole from banks, the dominant financial
institution in these countries. By contrast, in the middle and high income countries, there has been
a substantial increase.
TABLE 3

D om estic Credit Provided to the Private Sector and Credit Provided by the B anking Sector,
Percentage of G D P,1990 and 2003
Country

Armenia
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Cambodia
Cameroon
CAR
Gabon
Honduras
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Mongolia
Nicaragua
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Low Income
Middle Income
High Income

Domestic Credit to
the Private Sector
1990

Domestic Credit to
the Private Sector
2003

40.4
16.7
24.0
--26.7
7.2
13.0
31.1
--1.0
19.0
112.6
13.9
4.0
8.9
22.3
43.0
125.8

6.0
28.8
49.0
7.9
10.2
5.9
10.8
40.6
4.8
6.5
30.3
26.4
7.6
6.9
6.7
27.0
64.2
158.3

Domestic Credit
Provided by the
Banking Sector
1990
58.7
23.9
30.7
--31.2
12.9
20.0
40.9
--5.1
72.4
206.6
34.6
17.8
67.8
44.3
64.3
153.1

Domestic Credit
Provided by the
Banking Sector
2003
5.5
38.4
60.0
7.2
16.0
14.7
17.5
37.7
11.4
10.1
38.0
96.5
8.4
12.5
38.2
45.3
85.3
181.9

Source:W orld Developm entIndicators 2005. Table 5.7;Table 5.5.

In most ofthese countries, credit creation relative to GD P fell betw een 1990 and 2003, w hile
for all low income countries, it rose somew hat, but is still at low levels relative to other regions of
the w orld.

CH ALLEN GE #3:GLO BAL SAVIN GS ARE SEVERELY MISALLO CATED
Are savings rates too low ? In some cases yes, but a more serious issue is that savings are severely
misallocated globally. As table 4 show s, in recent years a handful ofrich countries, most notably the
U nited States, has been running savings shortfalls relative to investment, w hile many other regions
ofthe w orld have been saving more than they have been investing. As a result, poorer countries
have become net lenders ofresources to the U nited States, or have borrow ed from the rest ofthe
w orld much less than they had in earlier periods. In short, globally speaking, resources are being
shifted from most ofthe w orld, including many relatively poor or middle income countries, to the
U nited States. In recent years, then, the U nited States has been utilizing an enormous share ofthe
w orld's savings. As Aizenman et al. [2004]confirm, most developing countries self-finance their
ow n investment, making little productive use ofthe global capital market. Yet, as w e have just
seen, many poor countries are not being served w ell by domestic financial markets either.
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TABLE 4

Trends in Savings,Investm ent and N et Lending Per cent of G D P
Category

Investment

Saving

Net

Investment

Saving

Net

Investment

Saving

Net

1983-1990

1983-1990

Lending

1991-1998

1991-1998

Lending

2004

2004

Lending

World
Industrialized
Countries
- US
- Euro Area
- Japan

2004

1991-1998

1983-1990

24.2

22.9

--

24.0

22.9

--

24.6

24.9

--

22.7

22.1

-0.6

21.6

21.1

-0.5

20.7

19.4

-1.8

20.2

17.5

-2.8

18.5

16.1

-2.4

19.6

13.6

-6.0

…

…

…

0.3

20.2

20.9

0.7

29.7

32.5

2.8

29.2

31.6

2.4

23.9

27.6

3.7

28.0

34.3

6.2

31.8

33.8

2.0

24.9

31.3

6.4

26.2

24.2

-1.9

27.5

25.4

0.4

29.2

31.5

2.3

21.6

18.5

-3.1

20.1

16.6

-3.5

21.0

20.6

-0.4

28.6

25.7

-2.9

32.8

31.3

-1.6

35.5

38.2

2.7

23.0

17.5

-5.4

25.6

22.9

-2.6

25.4

32.0

2.7

20.4

19.5

-0.9

21.2

18.3

-2.8

19.8

21.0

1.2

---

---

---

16.2

b

21.4

29.4

8.0

- Newly
Industrialized
Asia
Developing
and Transition
Economics
- Africa
- Developing
Asia
- Middle
East
- Latin
America
- CIS

a

b

24.2

b

8.0

Source:IMF, W orld Econom ic O utlook 2005, Table 43, pp. 271-273.
D eveloping and Transition Economies include Central and Eastern Europe and Russia;
N ote:`a':includes Russia;`b':D enotes 1999. D ata not available earlier.

As Table 4 show s, Africa is still a net borrow er offunds and its overall savings rate is low er than
that ofthe rest ofthe w orld. This is not surprising given the profound poverty that characterizes so
many countries on the continent. In principle, therefore, mobilizing more savings in sub-Saharan
Africa should be an important goal. H ow ever, ifthese savings failed to translate into domestic
investment and w ent overseas instead, then raising the savings rate w ould do little for grow th or
for the poor. Especially in Africa, capital flight is a severe problem [Boyce and N dikumana, 2001].
Capital management techniques, as w e discuss in section 6, can help stem this capital flight.

CH ALLEN GE #4:CRED IT AN D CAPITAL FLO W S ARE PRO -CYCLICAL
W hen capital flow s do come into many developing countries, they are often short-term and procyclical and are sometimes associated w ith ‘sudden-stops’. These, in turn, can lead to financial
crises capable ofhaving devastating economic impacts, especially for w omen and the poor. [Palma,
2000;O campo, 2003;and Singh and Zammit, 2000]. Estimates place the average cost ofa severe
financial crisis at 10 per cent ofGN P [Rodrik, 2006]. The threat ofsuch destabilizing crises leads
many countries to accumulate large amounts offoreign exchange reserves w hich are very costly to
hold and could be better spent on domestic investment [McKinley, 2006].

CH ALLEN GE #5:ABSEN CE O F LO N G-TERM, ‘PATIEN T’ CAPITAL
Short-term, unstable flow s ofinternational capital represent a more general and severe problem
facing many developing countries—namely, a dearth oflong-term, patient capital to support longterm investment [Stallings and Studart, 2006]. Most capital is ofa highly short-term nature,
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especially in the poorest countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. As a result, long-term
productive investment is extremely difficult and costly to finance.

CH ALLEN GE #6:IN SU FFICIEN T CAPITAL FO R SMALL AN D MED IU M
EN TERPRISES AN D PO O R H O U SEH O LD S
Finally, there is a lack ofcapital for small and medium enterprises and the poor in most regions of
the w orld [Stallings and Studart, 2006]. This problem flow s from many ofthe ‘stylized facts’
described earlier:high real interest rates and interest rate spreads, misallocation ofglobal financial
resources, the short-term and pro-cyclical nature ofinternational capital flow s, and the absence of
long-term, patient capital.
Pro-poor financial policies must solve many ofthe problems discussed here in order to
succeed. In sections 4-6 ofthis module, w e describe a range ofpolicies that can help meet these
challenges. W e also survey various experiences w ith financial institutions and policies that have
been associated w ith developmental finance, as w ell as assess their successes and failures. W e w ill
see that these policies tended to be the most successful w hen they satisfied several conditions:
•

They had strong monitoring mechanisms in place to increase the likelihood that they
could achieve their goals.

•

They operated in a context ofrobust aggregate demand so that there w as a facilitating
environment for economic grow th.

•

They also operated in a domestic and international environment in w hich there w as
not a large degree ofinstability.

•

They w ere part ofa coherent overall developmental plan implemented by the
government.

4 M O B ILIZIN G A N D CH A N N ELLIN G SA V IN G S FO R PRO -PO O R G RO W TH :
A CO N SID ERA TIO N O F PO LIC Y O PTIO N S 5
D omestic financial policy in developing countries should be driven by the follow ing objectives:the
financial system should operate in the service ofsustainable, stable and equitable economic
grow th, and it should place improvement ofthe living standards ofthe poor at the heart ofits
operations. The chieffunction ofthe domestic financial sector in developing countries is to provide
finance in adequate quantities and at appropriate prices for public and private investments and for
social expenditures that are central to a pro-poor grow th agenda. D omestic financial policies that
mobilize and channel domestic savings should therefore be evaluated according to the extent to
w hich they serve these ends. Any domestic financial reforms that improve the functioning ofthe
financial system along other dimensions (such as enhancing its liquidity and international
integration) should be secondary to the primary goal ofpromoting pro-poor grow th.
In w hat follow s, w e w ill see that there are numerous w ays that domestic financial policy can be
oriented tow ards a pro-poor grow th agenda. Before turning to specific policies, how ever, there are
three general points to make about all ofthe policy options that w e present here.
First, the appropriate mix ofdomestic financial policies for any one country depends on its
unique national conditions. Most important among these are the character and institutional
structure ofthe national financial architecture;institutional, regulatory and administrative
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capacities;and historical, political and economic conditions. Simply put:there is no single template
for domestic financial policy—w hat is a feasible, desirable, appropriate approach to policy in one
country may not w ork in another.
Second, in this module w e discuss policy options for the domestic financial sector, for central
banks, and for international capital flow s separately. In practice, there is a strong element of
complementarity among these three components ofthe overall financial environment. Indeed, the
success ofpolicy initiatives in one particular domain depends critically on the success ofenabling
or supporting policies in the other domains. For instance, w e w ill see in section 5 ofthis module
that a developmental central bank is critical to the success ofmany ofthe policies tow ard the
domestic financial sector discussed in this section. Similarly, w e w ill see in section 6 ofthis module
that certain policies tow ards international capital flow s (such as those that restrict outflow s)
buttress efforts to mobilize domestic savings.
There is also a complementarity betw een fiscal policies (see module #1) and efforts to mobilize
domestic savings. For instance, fiscal policies that promote domestic savings and enhance the
collection oftaxes from the w ealthy and from large firms (especially the foreign firms that are too
often granted tax holidays) necessarily increase the available pool ofresources that can be
allocated tow ards activities that serve a pro-poor grow th agenda.
Third, monitoring, performance assessment and policy dynamism are critical to the success of
and political support for all ofthe policies discussed in sections 4-6 ofthis module. Evidence from
many countries show s that development banks and other specialized banks, programs ofdirect
credit allocation, lending targets, credit guarantees, loan subsidies, tax credits and state subsidies
for targeted lending can all be managed and regulated effectively ifthe government and the
banking sector have the ability and commitment to monitor and assess these initiatives
consistently. The maintenance oftransparent and consistently enforced performance targets is
extremely important to ensuring that the policy measures discussed here can achieve their stated
goals. The design ofassessment measures and the technical ability to carry them out should be an
integral part ofthe process ofdesigning financial policies—these measures should not be an
afterthought that is hastily patched together once policymakers have become aw are ofcertain
problems, such as the misallocation ofresources.
Equally important to policy success is a commitment to dynamic, rather than static,
approaches to financial policy [see Grabel, 2004;Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004;and discussion in
section 6 ofthis module]. That is, policymakers should maintain a commitment to strengthening,
w eakening or even phasing out financial policies w hen the economic environment changes in a
w ay that renders old strategies no longer useful or viable or w hen the objectives ofa policy have
been achieved.
It is critical to acknow ledge that the challenges ofeffectively monitoring and adjusting policies
are neither greater nor lesser than the challenges associated w ith managing private banks and
international capital flow s in a volatile, liberalized environment. This is a point often overlooked by
orthodox economists w hen they quickly reject the kinds ofpolicies that w e discuss here on the
grounds that they do not have a proven track record or that developing countries have insufficient
institutional capacity to manage them.
W ith these three considerations in mind, w e w ill now describe a range ofstrategies tow ard the
domestic financial sector that can be used to mobilize and/or allocate domestic savings in the
service ofa pro-poor grow th agenda.
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4.1 D EPO SIT IN SU RAN CE TO EN H AN CE CO N FID EN CE IN TH E BAN KIN G SYSTEM
McKinley [2005]calls attention to the difficulty that banks in developing countries confront in
trying to mobilize deposits. There are many reasons for this, and one ofthe most important ofthese
is a lack ofa properly funded deposit insurance system. There is every reason to believe that a
properly funded and managed system ofdeposit insurance could help overcome the public’s lack
ofconfidence in the domestic banking system, and thereby contribute to an increase in the deposit
base available for bank lending [McKinley, 2005, p. 24].

4.2 D IRECT CRED IT ALLO CATIO N AN D SU BSID IZED LEN D IN G
There are many w ays that governments can and have influenced the price and allocation ofcredit
in accordance w ith their economic and social goals. Interest rate controls and programs for the
direct allocation ofcredit from the government to key sectors and firms w ere central to the
improvement ofliving standards and to the attainment ofgrow th and industrialization goals in
Japan, in most Continental European and East and Southeast Asian countries, and in Brazil during
the post-W W II era [see Chang and Grabel;2004;Stiglitz 1994;Chang, 1994;W ade, 1990]. More
recently, China, Taiw an Province ofChina (PO C) and India have all used programs for direct credit
allocation successfully [see Epstein et al., 2004 for details]. All ofthe governments mentioned have
also subsidized lending in accordance w ith various economic and social goals.

4.3 LEN D IN G TARGETS AN D CEILIN GS, AN D TAX IN CEN TIVES
Lending targets or tax credits can promote bank lending in support ofa range ofidentified
economic and social goals through a number ofmeans. Government influence over loan allocation
can involve the establishment oftransparent lending targets that are imposed on private, quasiprivate or publicly controlled banks. Today, such programs are in place in a number ofcountries.
For instance, in India, N epal, Pakistan and, to some extent, the Philippines, banks are required to
channel significant proportions oftheir loan portfolios to agriculture and other sectors identified as
disadvantaged.6 In India, all commercial banks and regional rural banks are required to lend 40 per
cent ofnet bank credit to identified priority sectors. W ithin this 40 per cent target, at least 18 per
cent ofnet bank credit must go to agricultural borrow ers, 10 per cent must be extended to
identified ‘w eaker’ sectors (namely, small and marginal farmers, rural artisans and agricultural
labourers), and the remaining 12 per cent must be allocated either to the previously mentioned
types ofborrow ers or to small-scale industry. O fthe lending to small-scale industry, 40 per cent
must be allocated to w hat is termed ‘tiny’ industry.
The tax system can also be used to direct credit tow ard those projects that fall w ithin a
pro-poor grow th agenda. Tax incentives can encourage banks to lend to certain types offirms
or sectors, or to particular social groups, such as the poor, first-time entrepreneurs, w omen and
ethnic minorities.
Another strategy that can be employed by governments is the establishment ofceilings on the
percentage ofbank loan portfolios that can support activities in ‘non-priority’ sectors or activities,
such as securities trading, real estate or off-shore investments. For example, Taiw an PO C had such a
program in place from 1989 to 1995. The lending ceiling limited the ability ofbanks to lend to the
real estate sector. This ceiling w as introduced follow ing the development ofa real estate bubble
that caused fears offinancial instability [for details on Taiw an PO C, see Epstein et al., 2004;Chin and
N ordhaug, 2002]. Governments can also preclude all banks or certain types ofbanks from
participating in non-priority sectors, such as securities trading.
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4.4 SPECIALIZED LEN D IN G IN STITU TIO N S AN D D EVELO PMEN T BAN KS
Specialized lending institutions can be established to serve particular mandates. These might
include encouraging entrepreneurship among w omen, minorities or the poor, supporting the
development ofSMEs, or promoting the development ofnew technologies (such as those that
encourage favourable environmental outcomes).7
Another means ofensuring the provision offinance to particular sectors or firms is through
the creation ofdevelopment banks w ith narrow mandates. D evelopment banks can be publicly
financed and managed as in Brazil, Republic ofKorea, Japan and France, or can be privately
financed as in the case ofGerman industrial banks. It is also conceivable that these banks could
be organized as public-private hybrids and could raise capital on international markets and even
from private donors.
D evelopment banks are the institutional counterpart ofthe industrial policies and public
investment programs that have been critical to the success oflate developing (or ‘new ly
industrializing’) countries, as the experiences ofseveral countries suggest. W e w ill now consider
the performance ofdevelopment banks in the ‘developmental states’ ofthe post-w ar period.
Amsden [2001]describes how many late industrializing countries developed a manufacturing
base and rapidly industrialized after W W II (eventually moving into mid-level and even hightechnology production) thanks to state efforts to harness the domestic financial system in order to
mobilize and allocate medium- and long-term finance for industrialization. She show s that
policymakers in these developmental states utilized stringent controls and monitoring mechanisms
to ensure that the investment projects and firms that received finance from development banks
w ere at the heart ofthe state’s industrialization goals. W here development banks w ere most
successful they w ere supported by developmental central banks (see section 5 ofthis module) and
firm performance standards. The latter often involved export targets—firms that failed to meet
their targets w ere often denied further access to subsidized loans.
Amsden argues that development banking filled the void left by the absence ofother financial
institutions in the post-w ar environment, pointing out that these banks initially invested in key
infrastructure that later generated demand for local labour and inputs that created business groups
and local know ledge. Furthermore, development bankers themselves learned important skills such
as project appraisal in the course oftheir operations (ibid., p. 126). It is important to note that
foreign direct investment played a relatively minor role in post-w ar industrialization and capital
formation. Instead, the state, public investment and development banks w ere the prime movers of
the industrialization process.8
D evelopment banks raised capital at home or abroad and then utilized it either to purchase
equity in private or public firms or to lend to such firms at below market interest rates. The
lending terms ofdevelopment banks w ere almost alw ays concessionary [ibid., p. 132]. Effective
real interest rates w ere often low , even negative. The public finance ofdevelopment banks in
many developmental states w as often ‘off-budget’ and related to non-tax revenues. It derived
from foreign sources, deposits in government-ow ned banks, postal savings accounts and
pension funds. Especially in East Asia, these revenues often lay outside the general budget and
parliamentary process, thereby strengthening the hand ofprofessional bureaucrats, as in postw ar France and Japan.
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Governments in developmental states also controlled non-tax-related sources offunding, such
as foreign borrow ing (through loan guarantees), ow nership offinancial institutions and the
disposal ofprivate savings (for example, through postal savings banks) [ibid., p. 133;135].
According to Amsden, the major w eakness ofdevelopment banks w as not that they spent on the
w rong industries, but that, in some cases, they spent too much overall. [Also see Stallings and
Studart, 2006].
Finally, the state played a central role in long-term credit allocation in the post-w ar era, even
in those parts ofthe w orld w here development banks w ere ofrelatively minor importance (e.g.,
Malaysia, Thailand, Taiw an and Turkey) [Amsden, 2001]. In these cases, the entire banking sector
in these countries w as mobilized to direct long-term credit to targeted industries, thereby "acting
as a surrogate development bank" [ibid., p. 129].
Mechanisms to finance public investment programs can be created through fiscal policy
reforms (see Training Module #1). Public debt market reforms can also play a role in this
connection, as Epstein and H eintz’s [2006]w ork on Ghana suggests. In the case ofGhana, they
suggest that the government develop longer-term public debt instruments as a w ay oflow ering
interest costs (w hich are high on short-term instruments) and as a means ofraising funds to finance
public investment. This proposal has obvious relevance outside the Ghanaian context.

4.5 CRED IT GU ARAN TEE SCH EMES TO RED U CE RISK PREMIA O N
MED IU M- AN D LO N G-TERM IN VESTMEN TS
Banks in developing countries are often unw illing to extend credit to medium- and long-term
investments because ofthe perceived risks and the availability ofsubstitute assets, such as
Treasury bills, that have high returns and are less risky. O ne w ay ofreducing the risk associated
w ith these investments (and thereby encourage lending over the medium- and long-term) is to
have the government guarantee a portion ofthe loan to support approved projects. In a U N D Psponsored study ofGhana, Epstein and H eintz [2006]propose public underw riting ofloans to
low er risk premia on investments that support the objectives ofemployment creation and
poverty reduction. Their proposal has relevance beyond this national environment, and w e
therefore reproduce it here.
In a credit guarantee program, the interest charged on guaranteed loans w ould be low er than
the prevailing market rate. The appropriate level for the concessional interest rate w ould be a
w eighted average ofthe market rate ofinterest for the type ofloan extended and the risk-free rate
ofreturn on government securities. At this rate ofinterest, the program w ould not place any
economic burden on the banks that participated in the guarantee scheme. H ow ever, it does
suggest that the low est possible interest rate w ould be the prevailing rate on government
securities (for a 100 per cent secured loan). Therefore, such a credit guarantee program could only
low er the cost ofborrow ing so far. The program w ould therefore be more effective ifpaired w ith
other strategies to reduce the average costs ofborrow ing throughout the economy (on the latter
issue, see below ).
In a credit guarantee program, borrow ers w ould be required to supply some form ofcollateral,
even ifa large portion ofthe loan w ere guaranteed. This is an important mechanism forensuring that
loan guarantees do not create perverse incentives. The collateral requirements w ould be less
stringent than forothertypes ofloans. Coupled w ith monitoring and performance targets, the
collateral requirement could reduce the perverse incentives forborrow ers associated w ith loan
guarantees (and the potential drain on public resources ifthe loan w ere to become non-performing).
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4.5.1 H ow Can B orrow ing Costs B e Low ered?
A reduction in domestic interest rates is an important part ofa pro-poor grow th agenda,
particularly because low er interest rates can support some ofthe programs considered here, such
as credit guarantee schemes. Certainly incomes and competition policies might be necessary w ere
reductions in the average interest rate to raise inflation rates beyond a moderate level [Pollin et al.,
2006;McKinley, 2005].
Average borrow ing costs could be reduced through a number ofmeans. W e know that it
w ould be far easier for central banks to low er their prime lending rates w ere programs ofinflation
targeting to be abandoned (see Training Module #2 and section #5 ofthis Module) [Pollin et al.,
2006;McKinley, 2005]. The introduction or strengthening ofcompetition policies could also
address banking sector concentration, and thereby also create the possibility that average interest
rates in the economy could be reduced [Epstein and H eintz, 2006;McKinley, 2005]. Enhancing the
competitiveness ofthe process by w hich government debt w ere sold (e.g., through government
auctions) could also promote reductions in average interest rates because governments w ould not
be able to influence auction outcomes.
Interest rates on desired types ofassets can be low ered through a numberofmeans considered
in this section ofthe module. Credit guarantees ofthe sort described here, asset based reserve
requirements (see section 4.6) and direct subsidies orconcessionary loan rates forespecially desirable
projects (see section 4.2) are all w ays that interest rates on some types ofprojects can be reduced.
N ote that direct subsidies orconcessionary loan rates can be an expensive undertaking, but there
may be particularcases, such as forprojects w ith especially large employment multipliers, w here
such measures may be w orthw hile [McKinley, 2005, p. 23;Pollin et al., 2006].

4.6 VARIABLE ASSET-BASED RESERVE REQ U IREMEN TS
Another means to ensure that the domestic financial system serves the objectives discussed above
is through a system ofvariable asset-based reserve requirements for financial firms. A system of
variable asset-based reserve requirements has three chiefcomponents:1) all financial firms in
the economy are required to hold differential reserves against different types ofassets in their
portfolio, such as stocks, bonds, mortgage, consumer, or small business loans;2) financial
regulators establish and manipulate the required reserve ratio against each type ofasset based
on government objectives vis-à-vis encouraging certain types ofinvestments (for example, in
employment-intensive sectors) and their evaluation ofa number offactors, such as the risk
associated w ith that asset and market conditions;and 3) required reserves are held in non-interest
bearing deposit accounts at the central bank.
Variable asset-based reserves provide regulators w ith a means to encourage financial
institutions to hold certain types ofassets by reducing the ratio ofrequired reserves that must be
held against them, and thereby low ering the cost ofholding certain assets (and vice versa). Variable
asset-based reserves provide regulators w ith a means to target sectoral imbalances involving
over—investment in some sectors and under—investment in others, as w ell as w ith a means to use
the financial system in the service ofeconomic and social goals.
A system ofvariable asset-based reserves can also reduce the risk offinancial crisis through tw o
channels. Regulators can use the asset-based reserve requirements to deflate bubbles in particular
asset markets as they emerge and before they culminate in financial crises. The system also
functions as an automatic stabilizer because it requires financial institutions to deposit additional
reserve holdings w henever asset values rise or w henever new types ofassets are created.
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4.7 EMPLO YMEN T-O RIEN TED FIN AN CIAL PO LICIES:D ESCRIPTIO N O F
A PLAN D EVELO PED FO R SO U TH AFRICA
As a concrete example ofsome ofthese policies, w e w ill briefly describe a set offinancial market
interventions developed by Pollin, et. al. [2006]. They propose a set ofemployment-oriented
financial policies capable ofcontributing to the South African government's goal ofreducing
unemployment by halfin ten years. This plan puts forw ard a set ofcredit allocation policies
designed to target employment-generating projects. The proposal has clear relevance outside
ofthe South African context. For this reason, w e describe it in some detail below .
The plan outlines three main policy tools to channel credit to targeted industries at
concessionary rates w ith the goal ofgenerating employment. A first policy tool is a major
expansion in the lending activity and developmental focus ofthe country's currently existing
development banks. The Industrial D evelopment Corporation is South Africa's largest development
bank. Its 2005 Annual Report reported that through its lending activity over 2004-05 it anticipated
creating 16,700 jobs. H ow ever, this is far too modest a contribution for such an important
institution, given that the official statistic of4.3 million unemployed people in 2005 is 257 times
larger than this figure of16,700. The capitalization ofthese banks therefore needs to increase, so
they should be allow ed to assume a higher level ofrisk on behalfofan employment-targeted
grow th agenda.
A second policy tool for channelling credit is the establishment ofasset reserve requirements
for private banks and other financial institutions (see section 4.6). For example, the plan stipulates
that banks should hold 25 per cent oftheir loan portfolio in designated employment-generating
activities. Ifthe subsidized activities accounted for less than 25 per cent ofa bank’s total loan
portfolio, the bank w ould have to cover this gap by holding cash. Features ofthis proposal are
comparable to the system of‘prescribed assets’ that operated in South Africa from 1956 to1989.
H ow ever, the Pollin et al. [2006]plan proposes more flexible measures (for example, it allow s banks
that hold more than 25 per cent oftheir loans in subsidized activities to sell permits to institutions
w hose targeted industries account for below the 25 per cent minimum ofsubsidized loans).
A third tool for channelling credit is a major expansion ofthe government's system ofloan
guarantees. The South African government currently has a loan guarantee program but it is far too
small. U nder the government's current loan guarantee program, the accruals on its contingent
liabilities—i.e., the amounts that the government actually pays w hen loans default—has been a
trivial cost, amounting, on average, to 1/100 ofone per cent or less over the recent past. The plan
described here proposes the follow ing program instead. The government underw rites about R40
billion per year in loans, i.e., a figure approximately equal to 25 per cent offixed capital formation
as of2004. The plan assumes a default rate on these loans of15 per cent and loan guarantees
covering 75 per cent ofthe principal on defaulted debts. W ithin this scenario, it follow s that the
accruals to the government w ould amount to R4.5 billion/year (i.e., R40 billion x .15 x .75). This is a
crucial result. It show s that the government has the capacity to underw rite a major loan guarantee
program, roughly equivalent to 25 per cent ofproductive investment in the economy, w ith a
financial commitment ofno more than 1-2 per cent ofits fiscal budget.
These three parts ofthe credit allocation plan amount to having the financial sector subsidize
credit for certain borrow ers. Three key issues arise in this connection:1) w ho should receive the
subsidized credit? 2) w hich institutions should allocate the credit?;and 3) w hat monitoring should
be put in place to ensure that the funds are w ell spent and achieve their desired goals, namely,
facilitating pro-poor grow th?
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W ho should receive subsidized credit? The fundamental purpose ofthe expanded credit
allocation policies is to facilitate a program ofrapid employment grow th. Subsidized credit should
be directed tow ard viable businesses that w ill expand employment.
The plan proposes that businesses, including co-operatives and non-profit organizations, be
eligible for credit based on tw o criteria. The first is ‘social priority lending’ for small-scale activities.
Three areas that fall under this heading are:land reform and rural development, w hich w ould help
generate and build assets for the rural poor;the promotion ofSMEs, a basic challenge for many
developing countries and one that should be part ofany pro-poor financial policy [Stallings and
Studart, 2006];and the promotion ofcollectives and other alternative ow nership forms, since for
the poor, new and alternative ow nership forms can be crucial to individual efforts to leave poverty
behind by generating asset ow nership and employment.
The second criterion stipulates that a firm that does not meet the ‘social priority’ criterion w ill
be eligible for concessionary loans ifit can demonstrate that its project w ill produce large positive
employment effects. Thus, to apply for a loan under this program, a firm w ould have to provide an
employment impact statement demonstrating the overall number ofjobs to be created by its
investment. The employment impact statement should include both the direct and indirect job
effects ofthe project to be financed by the loan.
W ho w ould provide the loans? According to this plan, both public and private financial
institutions w ould provide these loans. There are currently a number ofdevelopment banks and
public and quasi-public financial institutions in South Africa. O ne ofthe largest is the Industrial
D evelopment Corporation, w hich has committed itselfto expanding its developmental role in
general, including its role in job creation [Mondi, 2006]. The plan w ould involve expanding the
role ofthe development banks, such as the Industrial D evelopment Corporation, in employment
creation, as w ell as mobilizing the private financial system through loan guarantees and asset
reserve requirements.
The plan w ould also encourage small-scale banking, a so-called second tier ofinstitutions, to
enter the market, perhaps w ith the support ofthe Reserve Bank ofSouth Africa (see section 5 ofthis
module). D evelopment banks could encourage this second tier banking system by investing in the
creation and expansion ofsuch institutions.
The program ofloan guarantees w ould underw rite an expansion ofR40 billion and aim for a
default rate of15 per cent, w hile the government w ould guarantee 75 per cent ofthe principal. The
cost w ould be about R4.5 billion/year, w hich comes to about 1.2 per cent ofgovernment spending.
This is significant, but the goal w ould be to generate thousands ofjobs that w ould expand both the
economy and government revenue.
An advantage ofthis plan is that it w ould be profitable to private lenders as w ell as help to
expand credit and employment. H ow ever, to guarantee its efficacy, careful monitoring systems
w ould have to be set up. The plan proposes that these include a series ofemployment targets,
escrow accounts, rew ards for w histle blow ers w ho report corruption, and penalties for those w ho
do not meet the targets (readers are encouraged to see Pollin et al. [2006]for details on measures
to reduce corruption, fraud and inefficiency since these may be relevant in some contexts).
Those receiving priority lending w ould be required to deposit part ofthe loan in escrow
accounts, w ith the balance to be returned on repayment ofthe loan. The size ofthe escrow
required w ould be inversely related to the size ofthe subsidy the government chose to grant
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to the borrow er. In addition to setting the size ofthe escrow account, the lender w ould engage in
normal monitoring ofthe loan. For large-scale employment loans (that is, granted to firms that
produced employment impact statements), monitoring w ould be oriented tow ards assuring that
the firms fulfilled their employment creation promises.

4.8 IMPRO VEMEN T O F BU SIN ESS SERVICES AN D IN FO RMATIO N RESO U RCES
TO FACILITATE LEN D IN G TO SMEs9
The lack ofskills, technical support and adequate information among SMEs limits the w illingness of
banks to lend to such enterprises. Thus, there is a need to develop capacity for technical assistance,
particularly in terms ofmanaging the risks faced by SMEs. For example, legislation could be
enacted requiring all banks to have an effectively functioning desk to deal w ith SME applications.
Specific parameters w ould be set to evaluate w hether banks w ere complying w ith the regulations.
Similarly, government could spearhead policies in support ofthe establishment ofcredit bureaux
to collect and maintain information on potential borrow ers. These credit bureaux could be
designed to deal specifically w ith the information problems associated w ith small-scale credit
applications. The credit bureaux could be charged w ith facilitating financial services betw een
lenders and potential borrow ers.

4.9 FO RGIN G LIN KAGES BETW EEN IN FO RMAL AN D FO RMAL FIN AN CIAL IN STITU TIO N S10
In some countries, informal financial institutions presently fill important needs-namely, they
provide credit (though often at high cost) to rural communities and to small businesses. The
informal financial sector may have an advantage over the formal financial sector in making small
loans. H ow ever, the lending capacity ofthe informal sector is clearly limited because its deposit
base is necessarily small [Selvavinayagam, 1995]. Policymakers in developing countries have tw o
options w hen it comes to the informal financial sector:they can either increase the ability of
informal financial institutions to perform their traditional functions, or they can enhance the ability
ofthe state and/or the formal financial sector to mobilize and channel capital to the underserved
rural communities and small businesses. The latter strategy is clearly preferable, but w e appreciate
that the former may be more feasible in some contexts, especially in the short run. For this
pragmatic reason, w e w ill now describe some strategies for enhancing the performance of
the informal financial sector.
By w ay ofbackground, w e should acknow ledge that informal financial institutions have
diverse organizational structures and that they interact w ith formal institutions in a variety of
w ays. In some cases, informal financial institutions closely resemble formal institutions w ith
regard to their scale ofoperation and average loan size. Interestingly, large-scale informal financial
institutions have lent substantial sums to medium-sized enterprises in Taiw an PO C [Tang, 1995].
These informal financial institutions have been encouraged by the government [Biggs. 1991;
Pickbourn, 2006].
In some contexts, informal financial institutions may compete w ith or substitute for the
services provided by formal financial institutions.11 In other cases, complementarities betw een
informal and formal financial institutions exist. For example, formal financial institutions may lend
informally mobilized deposits or informal lenders may act as intermediaries for formal institutions
[Aryeetey 2003]. In still other cases, there is little—ifany—interaction betw een formal and informal
financial institutions due to the fragmented nature offinancial markets in some developing
countries [Aryeetey, 1998;Selvavinayagam, 1995].
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Policymakers w ho choose to enhance the performance ofthe informal financial sector w ould
do w ell to develop complementary linkages betw een informal and formal institutions. For instance,
relationships could be built betw een formal banks and rotating savings and credit associations to
facilitate group savings and lending for informal and small enterprise development [AmoakoTuffour, 2002;Aryeetey, 1998]. Aryeetey [1998]suggests that formal banks could encourage
informal institutions to place their deposits w ith them by offering a preferential deposit interest
rate and by w aiving fees on their demand deposits. In addition, he suggests that agency-type
relationships could be developed among w ell-established informal, semi-formal (e.g., N GO s and
microfinance) institutions and formal lenders. In this scenario, formal banks w ould channel some
oftheir funds to semi-formal and informal lenders for lending to small borrow ers.
Aryeetey rightly suggests that only recognizable, w ell-established informal lenders should
be involved in such a program, namely lending associations, cooperatives and unions. H e also
suggests that other mechanisms for forging linkages betw een formal and informal financial
institutions might involve creating tax incentives to compensate formal banks for the costs and
risks ofdeveloping small borrow er portfolios (i.e., by offering tax reliefto formal banks that
allocate credit through semi-formal and informal agents) and modifying certain restrictions as
to the types ofassets that formal financial institutions can hold to encourage them to invest in
semi-formal institutions.
N ote that developing these new institutional relationships betw een formal and informal
financial institutions w ould require a broader regulatory structure for suppliers ofcredit, one that
w ould specifically incorporate a role for informal credit institutions in those countries w here such
institutions are currently playing important roles. At this point, the lack ofprudential regulation of
informal financial institutions may hinder the w illingness offormal institutions to increase their
ties w ith informal institutions. It w ould therefore be important for policymakers to develop an
appropriate regulatory framew ork for informal financial institutions, particularly in those cases
w here they have chosen to increase the linkages betw een formal and informal institutions.
There is much research to be done on the issue ofregulating informal institutions. Preliminary
w ork along these lines appears in Lapenu [2002]and especially in D aley-H arris [2002, ch. 6]. The
latter argues that it is important to establish industry norms and standards for unregulated
microfinance institutions (MFIs), as w ell as to develop appropriate means to reinforce these
performance standards. D aley-H arris [2002]proposes specific performance indicators and norms
that can be used by regulators for monitoring the microfinance portfolios and organizational
capabilities ofregulated banks and MFIs. Aryeetey [1998]suggests a three-tiered approach to
regulation and supervision ofthe informal sector:formal banks lend to credible, semi-formal agents
w ho then link up w ith informal lenders;rural/small borrow ers receive loans directly from informal
agents;and semi-formal institutions can then be the agencies responsible for the regulation of
smaller, informal units.

4.10 EN H AN CIN G TH E ABILITY O F MICRO FIN AN CE IN STITU TIO N S (MFIs)
TO SERVE BO RRO W ERS
Much has been w ritten over the last decade about the remarkable grow th ofdiverse types ofMFIs
across all regions ofthe developing w orld [e.g., Versluysen, 1999;D aley-H arris, 2005, 2002;Zeller
and Meyer, 2002]. Although the structure and operating practices ofMFIs remain heterogeneous,
these institutions generally share a commitment to serving those social groups and small-scale
businesses that are not served by the formal financial sector. The lending ofMFIs can therefore
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promote some degree ofemployment creation and poverty alleviation by providing opportunities
for business activity by those groups (such as w omen) and to those areas ofthe country (especially
rural areas) that normally face severe credit constraints.
H ow ever, it should be obvious that MFIs are not the development panacea that many
enthusiasts suggest. Indeed, Rahman [1999], Grosh and Somolekae [1996], and Christensen [1993]
raise issues that complicate the generally sanguine view ofMFIs, w hile essays in Zeller and Meyer
[2002]also offer a more nuanced empirical view ofMFIs than one generally finds in the literature.
It is clear that MFIs cannot play a central role in promoting pro-poor grow th, nor are they an
appropriate institutional form to resolve problems ofsavings mobilization or allocation on the
macroeconomic level.
N evertheless, MFIs are a part ofthe financial landscape in many developing countries, and
they are supported by many external donors. Thus, it is reasonable to consider how the potential
ofMFIs to contribute to savings allocation and mobilization can be enhanced by the supportive
actions ofdevelopmental central banks and/or external actors. In w hat follow s, w e briefly survey
the most successful efforts to provide support to MFIs.
Central banks specifically support MFIs through credit guarantees and insurance,
participation in their capitalization, management, and establishment ofpriority sector lending
requirements, differential interest rates, preferential rediscount rates and facilities that target
credit/deposit ratios for rural bank branches.12 External support has been crucial to the success of
almost all MFIs. W hile central banks have generally not provided direct financial support to
MFIs that are not licensed financial institutions, there are a number ofimportant exceptions. In
Bangladesh, for example, the central bank provided support to the Grameen Bank from as early
as 1979, before it w as established as a specialized development bank in 1983. The central bank
also supported the bank w ith lines ofcredit.
Central banks may also operate as ‘second-tier’ institutions that channel funds to individual
MFIs. In N epal, for example, the central bank administers the Rural Self-Reliance Fund, w hich
provided w holesale funds to MFIs for lending to final borrow ers. In India, the N ational Bank for
Agriculture and Rural D evelopment w as established by the central bank as an apex body for rural
credit. It provides a small amount ofrevolving fund assistance to nonbank MFIs, w ith funding
obtained from the Sw iss Agency for D evelopment and Cooperation.
In Indonesia, the central bank disburses funds to the provincial government, commercial
banks and rural banks for lending to small financial institutions and micro-entrepreneurs under a
micro-credit project initiated w ith support from the Asian D evelopment Bank. These banks have
been highly successful in developing appropriate products and processes for reaching microentrepreneurs, though interest rates are high at around 2-4 per cent per month. Like the Grameen
Bank, they have enjoyed repayment rates ofover 95 per cent.
The issue ofappropriate regulation for MFIs cannot be ignored, and there is much research
that needs to be done in this area. Based on experiences in Ghana and the Philippines, Gallardo
[2001]describes a tiered regulatory structure for MFIs and has identified threshold levels of
intermediation that trigger the need for external regulation oftheir activities. External regulation
is not called for w here MFIs (and informal lenders) do not access funds beyond members’ savings.
H ow ever, a higher standard ofregulation is called for w hen MFIs access funds from external
sources. In such cases, the standard registration procedures that apply to formal financial
institutions (involving, for instance, filing documents regarding the establishment and the
governance structure ofthe institution) should apply to all MFIs.
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An even higher level ofregulation applies to institutions engaged in financial intermediation
that does not include retail deposit-taking activities. These institutions should be monitored
through standard periodic reports. Even more stringent regulation should apply to all limitedlicense banks and non-bank MFIs, permitting them to take deposits from the general public that
are limited to a multiple ofthe institution’s total qualifying capital. Such institutions may need to
comply w ith higher capital adequacy guidelines and restrictions on their services and operations.
The highest level ofregulation applies to licensed banks that are permitted to mobilize retail
deposits from the general public. These institutions should be subject to full offsite and onsite
supervision, licensing requirements and full prudential supervision by the regulatory authorities.

5 CEN TRA L B A N K S A S A G EN TS O F PRO -PO O R G RO W TH :
A CO N SID ERA TIO N O F PO LIC Y O PTIO N S
As mentioned in section 4.10, central banks can play a role in supporting developmental lending by
MFI's and other institutions serving social needs. In the last several decades, how ever, this
‘developmental’ financial role for central banks has notbeen the norm. In fact, during the last
decade, central banks in developing countries have increasingly adopted approaches to monetary
policy that focus on low ering the rate ofinflation, w ith little regard to their impact on ‘real factors’
such as poverty, employment, investment or economic grow th. Among these approaches,
‘inflation targeting’ is the most prominent [Saad Filho, 2006]. At the same time, they have
eschew ed the broad range oftools ofcentral bank policy so w idely used by developed country and
developing country central banks for allocating credit to social priority sectors and managing the
international flow s ofcapital. Instead, most central banks now focus on a narrow range of
stabilization goals, using a narrow range ofinstruments, primarily short-term interest rates.
Follow ing this strategy, central banks attempt to hit a target range for inflation w hile mostly
ignoring the impact ofmonetary policy on other economic variables. By 2005, more than 19
countries had adopted inflation targeting and more countries are considering doing so [IMF, 2005].
Even w here countries do not implement form alinflation targeting, many ofthem—under pressure
from the IMF and other organizations—still orient policy almost exclusively to fighting inflation. In
many countries, inflation targeting has generated significant costs—slow grow th, sluggish
employment generation and high real interest rates—w hile yielding, at most, minor benefits.
Among the greatest disappointments for proponents ofinflation targeting has been its apparent
inability to reduce the so-called sacrifice ratio, the unemployment costs offighting inflation.
[Saad Filho, 2006].
Inflation targeting is also typically accompanied by the absence ofcredit promotion and
allocation policies by the central bank. In line w ith standard orthodox approaches, the central bank
has eschew ed ‘developmental central banking’ in favour offocusing exclusively on ‘stabilization’ as
the goal ofeconomic policy. This focus on fighting inflation and achieving stabilization, to the
exclusion ofaddressing other problems, is particularly puzzling in light ofthe w ell-know n evidence
indicating that moderate inflation (10-15 per cent) has no negative consequences on important
real variables [Bruno and Easterly, 1998;Zhu and Pollin, 2005].13 By contrast, the costs oflarge-scale
unemployment and slow grow th are high and w ell understood. For example, South Africa, w here
the unemployment rate is above 40 per cent, seems singularly ill-suited for such a policy, yet the
South African Reserve Bank is an enthusiastic supporter ofinflation targeting.
H ence, alternatives to this destructive monetary policy must be developed and promoted.
Indeed, a central component ofany macroeconomic policy aimed at tackling the ills ofpoverty,
high unemployment and slow economic grow th in developing countries must rest on a feasible
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and efficient framew ork for conducting monetary policy oriented tow ard these goals w hile, to be
sure, keeping inflation from escalating beyond a moderate level and holding other problems in
check. Along these lines, central banks must play a more pro-poor developmental role. This
developmental role has tw o components, one w ith respect to monetary policy and the other w ith
respect to sectoral and credit allocation policies.
Monetary Policy:W ithin a realtargeting framew ork for central bank policy, central banks first
choose a real target that is appropriate for that particular country—normally poverty levels,
employment grow th, investment or real economic grow th—and then choose a set ofmonetary
policy instruments to achieve that target. Central to this strategy is the recognition that in order
to achieve the chosen target, there w ill normally be other economic constraints that must be
confronted, including, most notably, inflation and balance ofpayments or exchange rate
constraints [Pollin, 1998]. In this situation, the central bank w ill normally have to hit multiple
targets and constraints. Therefore, taking into account the classic Tinbergen analysis, it w ill
need to implement several monetary policy tools, including perhaps, some new ones.
Sectoral Policy:W ith respect to sectoral policies, central banks can support institutions
facilitating the allocation ofcredit by the government and financial institutions for sustainable
grow th and employment generation as w ell as the accumulation ofproductive assets by the poor.
W e consider monetary and sectoral policies in sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
As w e w ill see below , changes in interest rates and other standard monetary tools are
important to low ering the cost ofcredit and expanding aggregate demand, as w ell as helping to
moderate inflation. Training Module #2 discusses this component in detail. H ow ever, for central
banks to have a truly significant impact on generating employment and reducing poverty, in many
cases they have to play a crucial developmental role and interact w ith the financial sector.
A discussion ofthis ‘developmental financial role’ ofcentral banks w ill be a key focus ofour
discussion here.
First, w e provide a briefoverview ofthe overall central bank framew ork that can be conducive
to pro-poor grow th.

5.1 MO N ETARY PO LICY:A REAL TARGETIN G APPRO ACH
This realtargeting framew ork has a number ofimportant advantages.
1. First and foremost, it places front and centre the economic variables that have the
most immediate and clearest association w ith social w elfare. The central bank w ill be
forced to identify this target and then reach it, and ifit fails to do so, explain w hy it
failed and how it w ill improve in the next period.
2. Given the public pressure to reach this target, the central bank w ill have significant
incentives to invest in research and other activities to improve its understanding and
develop tools to reach this real target.
3. Given that it w ill need to reach this target amid other constraints, it w ill need to
develop new tools ofmonetary policy. For example, ifa central bank must hit an
employment target subject to an inflation and balance ofpayments constraint, then—
in addition to interest rate policy—it might explore asset allocation strategies to
encourage banks to lend more to high employment-generating uses and capital
control techniques to manage balance ofpayments problems [Pollin, 1998;Epstein,
Grabel and Jomo, 2004].
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4. A real targeting approach lends itselfnaturally to a more democratic, transparent and
accountable central bank policy that serves the genuine needs ofthe majority of
countries’ citizens, rather than those ofa minority that typically benefits from the
combination ofhigh real interest rates, low inflation and slow er grow th.
5. The framew ork is much more conducive to tailoring monetary policy to the specific
needs ofdifferent countries. For example, ifa country has a particular problem w ith
generating good jobs for w omen or more jobs in a particular region ofthe country,
the real targeting approach is better suited to target such employment objectives
(along w ith more employment generally) and devise instruments to achieve them.

In short, the realtargeting approach to monetary policy is likely to be more relevant, flexible
and effective than inflation targeting.

5.1.1 Em p loym ent Targeting and CentralB ank Policy:A n Exam p le
An alternative targeting approach w ould target ‘real’ variables that contribute directly to the
economic w elfare ofthe majority ofthe country’s residents. The advantage ofa targeting approach
is that it requires the central bank to identify its goals, makes transparent w hether it is reaching that
goal, and therefore potentially increases the accountability ofthe central bank to the general
public. O fcourse, to make accountability a reality, additional political structures must be in place
as w ell. W e turn to this issue briefly at the end ofthis Module.
W hich real variable should be targeted? This w ill obviously depend on the particular
circumstances ofthe country involved. For some countries w ith a very large unemployment or
underemployment problem, such as South Africa, em ploym enttargeting is a good candidate. In
other cases, investment grow th or real GD P grow th w ould be more appropriate. U nlike the claims
made by proponents ofinflation targeting, the real targeting approach recognizes that one size
does not necessarily fit all. Still, employment targeting is a good example because creating gainful
employment must be a crucial element in pro-poor financial policy.
In this section w e have elaborated on one example, namely, an em ploym enttargeting
approach to monetary policy. O ther examples, such as investment or real GD P targeting, w ould
share many ofthe components described here.

5.1.2 Em p loym ent Targeting
W ith employment targeting, central banks w ould choose, or be given by the democratic
authorities, an employment, employment grow th or unemployment rate target. The central bank
w ould be required to devise means (i.e., instruments) for achieving that target. Ifit failed to achieve
the target during the allotted period, it w ould be required to explain w hy the target w as not
achieved, as w ell as to develop mechanisms for achieving the employment target in the next
period. Implemented in this w ay, targeting contributes to central bank transparency and
accountability, thus taking an important leaffrom the ‘inflation targeting’ book.
As mentioned earlier, the evidence indicates that ifinflation reaches high enough levels, it can
create significant economic and social costs. H ence, no central bank can entirely ignore inflation.
In the employment targeting approach, therefore, the central bank must achieve its employment
target subjectto an inflation constraint.W hat the inflation constraint is should depend on the
particular circumstances ofthe country involved. W hatever the level, as long as the constraint is
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binding or could be binding in a given period, it means that the central bank w ill essentially have
tw o targets—employment and inflation. And as Jan Tinbergen famously put it, policy makers need
as many independent instruments as they have independent targets.
Central banks used to have many tools ofmonetary policy (ofw hich w e w ill speak more
below ). H ow ever, w ith the rise ofneo-liberalism, including financial liberalization and the
elimination ofcapital controls in many countries, most central banks have dramatically reduced the
number ofindependent monetary tools they use, often to only one, namely, a short-term interest
rate. This tool alone w ill not generally be sufficient to both reach an employment target and satisfy
an inflation constraint. H ence, the central bank w ill have to develop new tools (or dust offold ones)
in order to implement this policy. H ow ever, the need for the central bank to learn and innovate w ill
most likely go far beyond this level for a simple yet profound reason:most central banks know very
little about how to generate employment.
The reasons for this need are many, but the most important is quite simple:for many years
now , most central banks have not had to w orry about generating employment because they have
been pressured to be concerned only about inflation (or the exchange rate). As a result, central
banks (and associated economic researchers the w orld over) have devoted millions ofdollars and
countless hours to economic analysis and modelling to figure out the relationship betw een
monetary policy and inflation, w hile spending virtually nothing on discovering the relationship
betw een monetary policy and employment generation. H ence, not only w ill the central bank have
to develop new instruments because it has more targets than instruments;but it w ill also have to
develop new instruments because the target is ‘new ’ and unfamiliar.
Research economists at the central bank w ill need to start conducting research on how to
use monetary tools to generate more employment;they w ill have to consult w ith business, labour,
organizations from the ‘informal economy’, maybe even N GO s (to say nothing ofthe labour
ministries in theirow n government), to try to develop approaches to generating more employment.
This re-orientation in research, and even a change in the culture ofthe central bank, could be
one ofthe most important and long-lasting results ofthe re-definition ofthe central bank target.
As central banks learn more about how to use monetary policy to increase employment, and
as they develop new tools to reach this target subject to an inflation constraint, they might
discover that they are re-inventing tools that w ere part ofthe standard central bank tool kit in the
developing w orld in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s:credit allocation policies;the provision ofsupport
to development banks;and regulations in support ofdevelopment lending (see below ). For the
most part, policies such as these that w ere largely eliminated in the 1990s—sometimes for good
reason, sometimes not—w ill be re-discovered, modernized and improved upon.

5.1.3 Com p lem entary Institutions and A dd itionalConsiderations
Because a more expansionary monetary policy m ightlead to other constraints, a central bank
oriented tow ards increasing employment is likely to require complementary policies to be
successful. These problems might include excessive inflation and capital flight. In addition, further
structural changes w ould likely be necessary to make central bank policy truly accountable.
Inflation:The monetarist view that inflation is alw ays and everyw here a monetary
phenomenon is false [Saad Filho, 2006]. More generally, excessive inflation is not likely to be a
prominent problem resulting from an employment targeting approach, as long as other economic
policies ofthe government, including fiscal policy, are responsible and as long as the economy is
not subject to excessive externalshocks. H ow ever, excessive inflation may rear its ugly head on
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occasion and economic policy must be prepared to deal w ith it. W e have already discussed
monetary policy tools to limit inflation. As the central bank develops new tools to enhance
employment grow th, it can, ifnecessary, use traditional monetary policy tools such as short-term
interest rates, to satisfy its inflation constraint. In some cases, w hen using interest rates to fight
inflation w ithout interfering w ith the employment grow th target may not be feasible, the central
bank may need to consider other options, such as temporary incomes policies. The combination of
policies required w ill vary depending on the country and the situation.
Capitalflight:Foreign and domestic investors might speculate against the central bank
policy, leading to capital flight, or more often, dow nw ard pressure on exchange rates and foreign
exchange reserves. Capital management techniques, such as capital controls, might be necessary
to insulate the economy from such speculative flow s. As Epstein, Grabel and Jomo [2004]show ,
countries successfully use a variety ofsuch techniques to manage their economies. (See section 6
for a discussion ofthese policies).

5.1.4 Possib le O b jections
Some w ill raise objections to the employment targeting approach specifically or to the real
targeting approach more generally. The most common objection likely to come from mainstream
economists is that monetary policy is incapable ofaffecting real variables, at least in the ‘long run’.
To adequately address this objection w ould require a separate paper, but w e w ould like to mention
a few key points on the theoretical and empirical side. O n the theoretical side, the notion that
monetary policy cannot affect real variables is based on an incoherent W alrasian macroeconomic
model, common to orthodox macroeconomics, w hich assumes aw ay problems ofuncertainty
and unemployment. In Marxian, Keynesian, Kaleckian, Post-Keynesian and even N ew -Keynesian
approaches, there are strong reasons to believe that monetary policy can have long-term, real
effects. O n the empirical side, a vast literature supplies strong evidence that monetary
policy has real effects.
Additionally, some w ill argue that developmentalist central banks could be captured by
‘special interests’ leading to ‘corruption’ and ‘rent seeking’. W hile it is true that any government
institution that can allocate resources may implement corrupt policies, this is not a unique attribute
ofstate-based policies. Private corporations can also be purveyors ofcorrupt practices, as the
multiple cases ofmassive fraud in Enron and many other companies have demonstrated. The
challenge ofdealing w ith corruption involves creating monitoring, transparency and accountability
mechanisms applicable to all institutions. These are mechanisms as applicable to private
corporations and the market as to the state.

5.2 SECTO RAL PO LICIES U SED BY D EVELO PMEN TAL CEN TRAL BAN KS
Monetary policy has typically been only one component ofcentral bank policy. U sing central banks
to promote sectoral and industrial development, as w ell as to achieve government goals to raise
the incomes and w ealth ofsectors ofsociety, has also been important in the history ofcentral
banking. Such policies and institutional attributes ofcentral banks have often been termed the
‘developmental’ role ofcentral banks [Epstein, 2006;Asian D evelopment Bank, 2000]. Although
this developmental role has now fallen out offavour in policy circles, it has not only been very
important historically, but also continues to be used to good effect in some countries
[AD B, 2000;Epstein, 2006;Stallings and Studart, 2006].
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This developmental role is a key component ofmonetary policy used for pro-poor grow th.
Moreover, since the major mechanism by w hich central banks have engaged in this policy is
through their regulation ofand interaction w ith the financial sector, this topic is central to our
discussion offinancial policies, even though it is located falls at the intersection betw een financial
policy and central bank policy.
H istorically, the role ofcentral banks as agents ofpro-poor development policy has varied
from country to country. U sing country examples from Amsden [2001], one can see that in India
and China, for example, central banks played a crucial role as part ofthe planning apparatus and
w ere key players in the allocation ofmedium- and long-term credit to industrial sectors. In Mexico
and Thailand, their role w as less important. In Brazil and Republic ofKorea, the role ofcentral banks
occupies a middle ground betw een those ofthe other tw o groups. In short, w hile not all
developing-country central banks have played a developmental role, in many they have done so
quite successfully.

5.2.1 India and China 14
Mr. P.C. Bhattacharyya, a former governor ofthe Reserve Bank ofIndia (1962-1967), describes the
role ofcentral banking in India in the 1960s:
“India has consciously chosen a policy ofplanned economic development… The traditional objective ofa
central bank is the maintenance ofprice and exchange stability. H ow ever, this is but a means to achieve
economic progress rather than an end in itself. In the context ofthe developing countries, these
objectives… have to be fitted into the broader and more compelling urge for furthering economic
grow th… A country must have an appropriate degree ofmonetary expansion to meet the increasing
requirements ofa grow ing economy… The aim ofa central bank in a developing country has, therefore,
to be the adoption ofadequate policies w hich aim at bringing about an appropriate degree ofmonetary
expansion along w ith price and exchange stability… Further, monetary policy in such a country has also
to provide for mobilization ofresources to the maximum possible extent, as w ell as provide for the most
efficient investment ofthe same for purposes ofdevelopment.” [Bhattacharyya, 1971, pp. 1-2].

This monetary manifesto provides a stark contrast w ith that ofthe orthodox central bank, but
does not seem that far different from the post-w ar practices ofFrance, Belgium, Italy and Japan.
(See Box 1).
Bhattacharyya emphasizes that monetary policy is only one part ofeconomic policy and that,
as a result, the central bank cannot be an entity unto itselfand independent from the government
[p. 15], a statement from a central banker that w ould shock today’s promoters ofthe orthodox
recipe. Bhattacharyya further notes that direct instruments ofmonetary control have an important
place in the tool kit ofmonetary policy:they can protect important sectors from credit tightening
and allow for more direct monitoring ofcredit use [ibid., p. 14]. This is a view ofmonetary policy
that is similar to those taken by French and Japanese central bankers.
As in the case ofpost-w ar European countries, India deployed a broad set ofcapital and
exchange controls, and initially, controls over current account transactions as w ell. These
complemented the mobilization and credit allocation techniques employed by the Reserve Bank
and associated institutions. Bhattacharyya further notes that price and exchange rate stability
cannot be ignored, but are part ofthe fundamental development process [ibid., p. 15].
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Since the 1970s, India has been engaged in a process offinancial liberalization. There have
been several reforms ofthe banking and financial sectors, liberalization ofinterest rates and
exchange controls and external financial liberalization as w ell. W hile elements ofthe old regime
still exist, the context w ithin w hich they operate has been radically altered [Saez, 2004]. The
recent increase in economic grow th in India has led some observers to hold liberalization and
globalization to be responsible. O bservers w ho agree w ith Amsden w ould suggest that it w as
during the post-w ar years ofplanning and credit mobilization and allocation, ofw hich the Reserve
Bank ofIndia w as a key part, that the foundation for recent grow th w as laid.
BO X 1

India
At the time ofindependence, India faced serious gaps in institutional structures for the mobilization ofsavings
and investment. The banking system w as mostly urban and short-term oriented, providing mostly w orking capital
ofa short-term nature [ibid., p. 3]. The stock market w as the mechanism for raising long-term capital, but, like
most stock markets, rationed out new firms. Thus, “it w as only natural that the Reserve Bank ofIndia… turned its
attention at the very outset, to the development ofvarious types ofnew institutional facilities to fill in the gaps.
This became one ofits main roles in pursuance ofthe broader objective ofthe promotional aspect ofcentral
banking policy” [ibid., p. 3]. The Reserve Bank established agricultural co-operative banks to help raise funds and
provide technical assistance;in the industrial field, the Reserve Bank contributed to setting up the Industrial
Finance Corporation ofIndia, w hich w as intended to supply the long-term capital needs ofindustry;the Reserve
Bank also contributed substantially to the capital structures ofvarious State Finance Corporations, w hich w ere
supposed to support the financial needs ofthe small industrial sector. In 1964, it also set up the Industrial
D evelopment Bank ofIndia as a w holly-ow ned subsidiary ofthe Reserve Bank to “function at the apex ofan
integrated structure ofindustrial finance as w ell as to provide resources for large-sized projects ofindustrial
development… ” [ibid., p. 5]. The Reserve Bank also promoted branch banking to mobilize savings and developed
a system ofindustrial subsidies and preferences for targeted industries [ibid, pp. 6-8].

In China, until recently, the central bank w as entirely subsumed into the state planning
apparatus. The banking industry has been entirely state-ow ned since the revolution and is highly
concentrated. The Chinese economy has been characterized by exchange and capital controls, as
w ell as strong controls over interest rates and financial markets [Saez, 2004;Epstein et. al., 2005a].
Since the late 1970s, how ever, the system has been undergoing steady reforms along w ith the
increased role ofmarkets, private investment and foreign investment in the Chinese economy.
(See Box 2).
Maintaining a low value ofthe exchange rate has been a crucial component ofChina’s
development strategy and, in turn, capital and exchange controls have been a crucial component
ofthat strategy. More recently, as interest rates, financial markets and capital controls have become
more liberalized, the People’s Bank ofChina has begun to take on more traditional macroeconomic
roles typical of‘modern’ central banks. Still, it relies heavily on credit controls to conduct monetary
policy, as it attempts to keep the Renminbi at an undervalued level for purposes ofexport
promotion. The central bank’s management ofthese exchange controls has been amongst its most
important developmental contributions in the last several decades.
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BO X 2

China
From 1949 until the late 1970s, China w as dominated by one bank:the People’s Bank ofChina (PBO C). It role w as
to help mobilize and allocate savings in accordance w ith the state plan. In the late 1970s the government started
to reform the banking system. By the early 1980s the PBO C had been separated from the Ministry ofFinance and
its monopoly position had been ended. Eventually, four major commercial banks w ere created, all state-ow ned.
Today, competing w ith the four state banks is a second tier ofstate-ow ned commercial banks. A third tier includes
shareholding smaller regional banks, many ofw hich w ere established as part ofthe special economic zones that
led the economic reforms ofthe 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, since 1994, there have been three policy
banks:the State D evelopment Bank, the Export Import Bank and the Agriculture D evelopment Bank. These banks
handle policy-related lending associated w ith government plans. In addition to these banks, China has a series
ofurban and rural cooperative banks [Saez, ch. 15]. Finally, there is a series ofnon-bank financial institutions,
including insurance agencies, credit unions and savings and loan associations. The presence ofprivate and foreign
banking in China is still marginal [Saez, p. 31].
O ne ofthe salient features ofChinese banking has been its close association w ith state-ow ned enterprises
(SO Es). This has now become a source ofsignificant banking problems due to the large number ofnon-performing
loans connected w ith these SO Es. Among the major issues facing the financial sector is the management ofthese
non-performing loans and the reform ofthe SO Es. The interpretation ofthese loans and the role ofSO Es in China’s
development are highly contested. O n the one hand, some argue that these loans indicate large-scale w aste,
inefficiency and corruption. Li argues, on the other hand, that the SO Es have been much more efficient than is
generally realized and have played a significant role in China’s industrial development and helped to stabilize
aggregate demand. Given China’s phenomenal industrial success and the large role ofSO Es in the Chinese
economy, it w ould be hard to make a case that they have played no role in China’s stunning development.
The Chinese C entral Bank w as created out of the People’s Bank of China (PBO C ) in 1983. The PBO C a
cted primarily as an agent of the government’s plan and did not exert a significant independent effect on
policy. Consequently, the C entral Bank is best seen as a supporter of the overall plan and of the credit
allocation accompanying C hina’s post-w ar grow th, taking into account the strengths as w ell as the
w eaknesses of those developments.

5.2.2 The Rep ub lic of K orea and B razil15
Republic ofKorea and Brazil both had central banks that w ere tied to the requirements of
government and the requirements ofindustry. (See Boxes 3 and 4).
BO X 3

Republic of K orea
As w e saw in our discussion ofAmsden’s w ork, crucial to Republic ofKorea’s post-w ar success as one ofthe “rest”
w as a strong planning and control mechanism combined w ith institutions for channelling long-term resources to
targeted infrastructure and productive industrial uses. As part ofthis mechanism, the Government retained strong
control over the financial system, particularly in the period 1961-1979 [N embhard, 1996, p. 90]. As one economist
put it, “except in times ofw ar, only a few nations have used policies ofselective credit control as w idely and
thoroughly as has Korea.” [quoted in N embhard, p. 91]. The Government used the banking system to channel
credit by setting low interest rates on loans to targeted borrow ers and by directing loans to particular enterprises.
Amsden emphasized that monitoring and performance requirements w ere associated w ith these loans.
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The government used ‘policy loans’ to direct lending for preferred purposes. Lending rates and lending conditions
w ere strictly controlled according to the type ofpreferential fund. This allow ed the Government to effectively
ration credit for certain purposes and ensure a plentiful supply for others.
W hat w as the role ofthe central bank in Korea’s development miracle? The MinisterofFinance supervised and
regulated all the activities ofthe banking system, including those ofthe central bank (the Bank ofKorea). As in France
and China, the Republic ofKorea’s central bank w as subservient to these planning institutions and performed its
assigned roles, w hich evolved overtime. Although the central bank w as established w ith some degree of
independence underthe guidance oftw o experts from the N ew York Federal Reserve in the 1950s, it w as soon
placed underthe de facto control ofthe Ministry ofFinance, until this subservience w as formally enshrined in
legislation in 1962 [Maxfield, 1997, p. 113]. At that time, the pow ers ofthe Bank w ere distributed amongst a number
ofentities, w hile the Bank ofKorea itselfw as left only w ith credit policy. “This left a central bank that overthe next
several decades did little more than implement credit policies in line w ith policies designed by the Economic
Planning Board and the Ministry ofFinance. In fact, the bank w as commonly called the ‘N amdaemun branch ofthe
finance Ministry’ referring to the Seoul district in w hich the bank is located.” [Maxw ell, 1997, p. 113]O verthe
follow ing tw o decades, the central bank remained politically w eak. The Bank oversaw the commercial banks’
implementation ofcredit distribution plans draw n up by the Economic Planning Board in accordance w ith overall
industrialization goals. Since government controls also limited the development ofthe financial sector, a strong
financial constituency did not develop to oppose the credit market policies [ibid, p. 115]. Complementing the control
overthe financial sectorw as an extensive set ofexchange and capital controls [N embard, pp. 85-92.]. These controls
allow ed the Korean government to keep interest rates low w hen they so chose and to allocate credit to desired
purposes w ithout much spillage overseas. They also helped to prevent macro-level financial instability arising from
unstable inflow s and outflow s ofcapital orfrom excessive short-term borrow ing.

Similar to other countries, in the 1990s, the Republic ofKorea liberalized its financial system,
eventually leading to the crisis ofthe late 1990s. Since that time, the Bank ofKorea has been far
more preoccupied w ith overall macroeconomic policy, and has had few er tools and less ofa
mandate to act as an agent ofdevelopment.
Brazil presents an interesting contrast w ith the Republic ofKorea. As in Korea, Brazil's central
bank w as part ofa developmental apparatus directed at promoting grow th and development.
H ow ever, because ofinsufficient planning coherence, use ofthe financial apparatus w as not as
successful as in the Republic ofKorea. (See Box 4).
BO X 4

B razil
Like many European central banks, the Brazilian Central Bank started offas a private bank, the Banco do Brasil,
w hich in the early 1900s financed coffee grow ers and industrialists [Maxfield, p. 123]. Then, in the 1920s, the Banco
do Brasil became a quasi central bank, but continued its policies ofsupporting these same sectors. British creditors
preferred to have a ‘real’ central bank that w as not so tied to domestic borrow ers, but the political pow er ofthe
coffee grow ers and industrialists prevented the creation ofa central bank to the creditors liking. A half-w ay
institution, the Superintendency ofMoney and Credit (SU MO C) w as created in 1945 to manage foreign exchange
and credit. H ow ever, the Banco do Brasil continued to formulate exchange rate and credit policy. It w as also the
recipient oflegal mandatory reserves by commercial banks, though it w as exempted from having to hold them
itself. H ence, it w as privileged, as w ere previous central banks in their early years, despite being profit-oriented.
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Although the political battles over the creation ofa full, public central bank continued, a central bank w as not
formally created until the military coup of1964. As soon as it w as created, how ever, its independent authority w as
undermined and it w as brought under the close authority ofthe central government [Maxfield, p. 136].
In this context, the Brazilian central bank has been tasked w ith implementing central government policy.
This policy itselfhas varied over time. W hen the Government w as focused on reducing inflation (1965-1967), it
pursued more liberal and outw ard-oriented policies. W hen the Government w anted to encourage rapid
industrialization (1950s, 1967-74, 1985-87), more inw ard-oriented policies w ere pursued and the central bank
contributed in classic fashion, helping to direct finances and granting favoured treatment to local industries, w hile
implementing strict controls on inflow s and outflow s ofcapital [N embhard, p. 145].
Yet, the implementation ofthese policies w as not nearly as effective as in the case ofthe Republic of
Korea. There w ere many factors at play. Among the most relevant for our purposes w as the highly decentralized
nature ofthe country’s financial system, w hich made it difficult for the central bank and related institutions to
monitor and control the allocation ofcredit. Thus, w hile the central bank, under the direction ofthe
Government, tried to act as an agent ofdevelopment, the relative lack ofa coherent planning process and the
difficulty ofdealing w ith a more dispersed financial system led to its being less successful in industrial policy
than the Republic ofKorea [N embard, ch. 5].

5.2.3 Thailand and M exico
The cases ofThailand and Mexico present an interesting contrast w ith China, India, the Republic of
Korea and Brazil [Maxfield, 1994;1997]. In these cases, relatively strong and independent private
financial systems, along w ith a stronger need to borrow from foreign creditors, led both domestic
and foreign creditors to support the creation ofrelatively independent central banks [Maxfield,
1994](See Box 5).
BO X 5

Thailand and M exico
In Thailand and Mexico, the central banks w ere much less closely tied to the financing industry and the
Governments than in China and India or Brazil and the Republic ofKorea. And w hile their positions changed over
time depending on both domestic and political factors, overall, these central banks played a larger role in
attracting credit from abroad and supporting the domestic financial sectors than they did in promoting
industrialization. In the 1990s, for example, in a move reminiscent ofthe roles ofthe Federal Reserve and the Bank
ofEngland, the central bank and Government ofThailand supported efforts to make Bangkok into a regional
financial centre as part ofa development plan [Ghosh and Chandrasekhar, 2001]. W ith the crash of1997, the result
w as not a happy one, how ever.
Arguably, then, these central banks w ere more oriented to finance and to international creditors than to
domestic industrial development. H ence, they acted less as agents ofdevelopment than the central banks in the
other countries.

In short, as the cases ofMexico and Thailand show , not alldeveloping countries have had
strong, development-oriented central banks. W here central banks w ere too closely tied to finance
and not closely enough tied to industry, they did not play the developmental role that many other
such banks played. The Thai and Mexican cases both indicate that not all developing countries
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have had developmental central banks that used the financial sector for developmental purposes.
They also plausibly suggest that countries that have not had developmental central banks have
paid a developmental price.

5.3 IMPLICATIO N S
The mobilization, allocation and monitoring ofmedium- and long-term credit w ere crucial to the
success ofthe new ly industrialized economies in the post-w ar period. H ow ever, the role ofcentral
banking in supporting these policies varied from country to country, as a function ofan array of
complex factors, including inherited financial and industrial structures, the need for international
finance, and various idiosyncratic factors that affected the politics ofcentral banking. The w ealth of
case studies show s that developmental central banks are not empirically anomalous. In some
countries, such as China, India and Republic ofKorea, conditions w ere ripe for central banks to play
a key role as agents ofdevelopment. In others, such as Brazil, the central bank played its role, but
the overall structure w as highly imperfect. In others, such as Thailand and Mexico, the central bank
w as not as firmly a part ofthe planning apparatus and tended to be more oriented to the needs of
the domestic and international financial interests than to those ofthe government or industry.
In all cases w here central banks played a crucial role, their connections w ith the state and w ith
credit allocation, coupled w ith their use ofcapital and exchange controls to manage the
international sector, w ere absolutely critical to their success. This approach hardly follow s the
recipe ofan independent central bank ofthe sort envisioned by orthodox economists.

6 TH E EX TERN A L FIN A N CIA L SECTO R A N D PRO -PO O R G RO W TH :
A CO N SID ERA TIO N O F PO LIC Y O PTIO N S
There is evidence from a variety ofcountries that w ell-designed policies to manage international
private capital flow s have played important roles during crucial periods in the development
process. W e term such policies ‘capital management techniques,’ follow ing Epstein et al. [2004].
Capital management techniques include (but are not limited to) measures that manage the
volume, composition or allocation ofcapital flow s and/or the maintenance ofrestrictions on
investor entrance and exit opportunities.
N early all developed countries utilized capital management techniques successfully over
long periods. For example, continental European countries employed extensive capital
management techniques during the economic reconstruction that follow ed W orld W ar II. Even
the U .S.A.—arguably the home offree capital flow s, and also a country w here the financial
system has benefited substantially from the receipt offlight capital from around the w orld—
employed temporary capital management policies in 1963 because they w ere w arranted by
economic circumstances.
Capital management techniques played critically important roles during the high-grow th
eras ofJapan and Republic ofKorea and w ere successfully employed in Brazil in the 1950s and
1960s (e.g., N embhard, 1996). Chile and Colombia successfully used capital management
techniques during the 1990s. The Malaysian government successfully employed stringent capital
management policies in 1994 and 1998. India, Singapore, China and Taiw an PO C employed
diverse strategies that could be termed (even ifnot by the Government itself) capital
management techniques during the 1990s.
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W e argue that this is a propitious moment foradvocates ofpro-poorgrow th strategies to
considerthe role that capital management techniques can play in supporting pro-poorgrow th
strategies. As w e w ill see, some types ofcapital management techniques have a proven track record,
not just in the decades that follow ed W orld W arII, but in the current environment as w ell. This latter
fact is increasingly recognized today, even by many prominent economists and the IMF [e.g., Prasad
et al., 2003]w ho have recently w ritten ratherpositively—though nevertheless cautiously—about the
role ofcertain types ofmarket-based, temporary capital management techniques.
Another reason that this is a propitious moment for advocates ofpro-poor grow th to consider
capital management techniques is that the problems associated w ith unfettered international
private capital flow s have become quite obvious, particularly in light ofthe financial crises in the
developing w orld during the 1990s. And finally it must be said that a pro-poor grow th agenda
simply cannot succeed in the absence ofsome type ofmanagement ofinternational capital
movements. Capital management techniques are not an end in themselves. Rather they are a
critical supporting player in a broader financial landscape in w hich the domestic financial system
mobilizes and channels domestic savings w ith the support ofa developmentalist central bank.
At this point, it is important to recall the three general points that w e made in connection w ith
our discussion ofpolicies tow ard the domestic financial sector (see section 4 ofthis module). O ur
earlier comment on nationally-specific policies is relevant to this discussion ofinternational capital
flow s insofar as policies designed to manage certain types ofinternational private capital flow s are
relevant to some countries, and not to others. W e know that for many developing countries, the
question ofhow to manage excessive Portfolio Investment (PI) and FD I inflow s is merely theoretical
because they attract little to none ofthese flow s in the first place. For some developing countries,
private remittances are extremely important as a source ofexternal finance, w hereas for others this
is not the case.
W ith regard to our earlier discussion ofdynamic financial policies, it is w orth mentioning here
Grabel’s [2004]proposal that developing countries implement a system ofdynamic, narrow ly
targeted and transparent capital management techniques that policymakers activate gradually
once particular types offinancial vulnerabilities are identified. There are certainly circumstances
under w hich more-or-less static capital management techniques are appropriate. H ow ever, there
are other national environments in w hich dynamic capital management techniques can be useful
and feasible. In such environments, capital management techniques are activated w henever
information about the economy indicates that such policies are necessary to prevent nascent
macroeconomic fragilities from culminating in serious difficulties or even in a crisis.
There are tw o tools envisioned in this approach—‘trip w ires’ and ‘speed bumps’. Trip w ires are
simple measures that w arn policymakers and investors that a country is approaching high levels of
risk in various domains (e.g., currency collapse, the flight offoreign lenders or investors, and the
emergence offragile financing strategies). O nce a trip w ire predicts the emergence ofa particular
vulnerability, policymakers w ould then immediately take steps to curtail this risk by activating a
targeted, graduated capital management technique, termed a speed bump. D eveloping countries
at different levels ofw ealth require distinct trip-w ire thresholds. Trip w ires w ould have to be
appropriately sensitive to subtle changes in the risk environment and adjustable. Sensitive trip
w ires w ould allow policymakers to activate graduated speed bumps w ell before conditions for
investor panic had materialized. (See sections 6.1-6.2 ofthis module for specific examples).
W e divide our discussion ofpolicy options tow ard private international capital flow s into
several sections—policies tow ard foreign bank borrow ing (section 6.1), portfolio investment
(section 6.2), FD I (section 6.3) and private remittances (section 6.4).16 O ur discussion ofthese
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diverse types ofprivate international capital flow s is motivated by the view that appropriate capital
management techniques can increase the likelihood that different types ofinternational capital
flow s support—and certainly do not disrupt—a pro-poor grow th agenda. The attraction ofany
type ofprivate international capital flow s, w ithout discrimination, should not be seen as a panacea
by policymakers (and accordingly, w e do not describe policies to attract private international
capital flow s). Rather, the question is how appropriate capital management techniques can
maximize the developmental potential ofthese flow s. Section 6.5 presents a briefdiscussion ofthe
complementarity betw een efforts to manage the exchange rate and international private capital
flow s. A thorough treatment ofstrategies tow ard the exchange rate is, ofcourse, outside the scope
ofthis module.
Tables 5 and 6 summarize many ofthe key aspects and impacts ofthe capital management
techniques employed by a range ofdeveloping countries during the 1990s [from Epstein, Grabel
and Jomo, 2004]. These tables complement the discussion below by giving quite specific and
concrete country experiences to illustrate the general points about capital management
techniques in the analysis that follow s.
TABLE 5

Experiences w ith CapitalM anagem ent Techniques in the 1990s*
Country
Chile

Colombia
Taiwan POC

Singapore

Types of Capital
Management Techniques
Inflows
Inflow management
FDI and PI: one year residence requirement
30 per cent URR
Borrowing Restrictions:
Tax on foreign loans: 1.2 per cent per year
Outflows
- no restrictions
Domestic Financial Regulations
- strong regulatory measures
Similar to Chile
Inflows
non-residents
- bank accounts can only be used for domestic
spending, not financial speculation
- foreign participation in stock market regulated
- FDI tightly regulated
residents
- regulation of foreign borrowing
Outflows
- exchange controls
Domestic Financial Regulations
- restrictions on lending for real estate and other
speculative purposes
Inflows
‘Non-Internationalization’ of Singapore $
Outflows
non-residents
- financial institutions cannot extend S$ credit to
non-residents if they are likely to use it for
speculation

Objectives of Capital
Management Techniques
- lengthen maturity structures and stabilize
inflows
- help manage exchange rates to maintain
export competitiveness
- protect economy from financial instability

Similar to Chile
- promote industrialization
- help manage exchange rate for export
competitiveness
- maintain financial stability and insulate
from foreign financial crises

- to prevent speculation against
Singapore $
- to support ‘soft peg’ of S$
- to help maintain export competitiveness
- to help insulate Singapore from foreign
financial crises
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- if non-residents borrow for use abroad, must
first swap into foreign currency
Domestic Financial Regulations
- restrictions on creation of swaps and other
derivatives that could be used for speculation
against S$
Malaysia

India

China

Inflows
- restrictions on foreign borrowing
Outflows
non-residents
- 12-month repatriation waiting period
- graduated exit levies inversely proportional to
length of stay
residents
- exchange controls
Domestic Financial Regulations
non-residents
- restrict access to ringit
residents
- encourage to borrow domestically and invest
Inflows
non-residents
- strict regulation of FDI and PI
Outflows
non-residents
- none
residents
- exchange controls
Domestic Financial Regulations
- strict limitations on development of domestic
financial markets
Inflows
non-residents
- strict regulation on sectoral FDI investment
- regulation of equity investments: segmented
stock market
Outflows
non-residents
- no restrictions on repatriation of funds
- strict limitations on borrowing Chinese
Renminbi for speculative purposes
residents
- exchange controls
Domestic Financial Regulations
- strict limitations on residents and non-residents

- to maintain political and
economic sovereignty
- kill the offshore ringit market
- shut down offshore share market
- to help reflate the economy
- to help create financial stability and
insulate the economy from contagion

- support industrial policy
- pursue capital account liberalization in an
incremental and controlled fashion
- insulate domestic economy from financial
contagion
- preserve domestic savings and
forex reserves
- help stabilize exchange rate

- support industrial policy
- pursue capital account liberalization in
incremental and controlled fashion
- insulate domestic economy from
financial contagion
- increase political sovereignty
- preserve domestic savings and foreign
exchange reserves
- help keep exchange rates at
competitive levels

Source:Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004.
*This description applies to the experience during the 1990s and not necessarily during the current period.
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TABLE 6

Effects of CapitalM anagem ent Techniques in Seven Cases
Country
Chile

Achievements
- altered composition and maturity of
inflows
- reduced vulnerability to contagion

Colombia

- similar to Chile but less successful

Taiwan POC

- kept debt load manageable
- helped keep competitive
exchange rate
- insulated from financial crises
- helped maintain economic
sovereignty
- insulated from disruptive speculation
- helped manage soft peg
- contributed to financial strength
- facilitated macroeconomic reflation
- helped to maintain domestic
economic sovereignty
- facilitated incremental liberalization
- insulated from financial contagion
- helped preserve domestic saving
- helped maintain economic
sovereignty
- facilitated industrial policy
- insulated economy from financial
contagion
- helped preserve savings
- helped manage exchange rate and
facilitate export led growth
- helped maintain expansionary
macro-policy
- helped maintain economic
sovereignty

Singapore

Malaysia

India

China

Supporting Factors
- well designed policies
- offered foreign investors
good returns
- state capacity
- flexible application
- less state capacity than
Chile
- less flexible

Costs
- higher cost of capital for
small firms

- strong state capacity
- strong economic
fundamentals
- public support for policies

- possibly contributed to
a less developed
financial sector
- possible cronyism/
corruption

- strong state and
bureaucratic capacity
- strong public support

- restricted the
development of the
domestic financial
sector

- strong state and
bureaucratic capacity
- strong economic
fundamentals

- constrained the
development of the
financial sector
- facilitated corruption

Source:Epstein, Grabel and Jomo, 2004.

6.1 PO LICIES TO W ARD FO REIGN BO RRO W IN G
It is critical that developing countries drastically reduce theirreliance on foreign bank loans since
repayment pressures have strangled economic grow th and seriously harmed the poorin many
countries. It w ould therefore be ofsignificant benefit ifpolicymakers enforced strict ceilings on the
volume ofnew foreign loans that can be incurred. Such ceilings might involve strict limits on the
allow able ratio offoreign to total loans, ormight require that firms finance only a specified
percentage oftheirprojects w ith foreign loans that have a certain maturity and/orlocational profile.
Restrictions on foreign lending could be deployed dynamically as circumstances w arrant,
follow ing the trip w ire-speed bump approach. U nderthis approach, policymakers w ould monitora
trip w ire that measured the economy’s vulnerability to the cessation offoreign lending. This involves
calculating the ratio ofthe government’s holdings ofcurrency reserves to private and public foreigncurrency denominated debt (w ith short-term obligations receiving a greaterw eight in the
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calculation). Ifthis ratio approached an announced threshold, policymakers w ould then activate a
graduated speed bump that precluded new inflow s offoreign loans until circumstances improved.
Policy can also discourage—rather than prohibit—the use offoreign loans as a source of
finance. The tax system can be used in a number ofw ays to discourage domestic borrow ers from
incurring foreign debt obligations. D omestic borrow ers might pay a fee to the Government or the
central bank equal to a certain percentage ofany foreign loan undertaken. This surcharge might
vary based on the structure ofthe loan, such that loans involving a locational or maturity mismatch
w ould incur a higher surcharge.17 Alternatively, the surcharge might vary based on the level of
indebtedness ofthe particular borrow er involved, such that borrow ers w ho already held large
foreign debt obligations w ould face higher surcharges than did less-indebted borrow ers.
This tax-based approach could encourage borrow ers to use domestic sources offinance since
these w ould not carry any surcharge. Another strategy might involve varying the surcharge
according to the type ofactivity that w as being financed by foreign loans. For instance, borrow ers
might be eligible for a partial rebate on foreign loan surcharges w hen loans w ere used to finance
types ofproduction that w ere highly employment intensive.
N ote that policymakers in Chile and Colombia employed tax-based policies to discourage
foreign borrow ing during much ofthe 1990s. In Chile, foreign loans faced a tax of1.2 per cent per
year (payable by the borrow er). Chilean policymakers also imposed a non-interest bearing reserve
requirement of30 per cent on all types offoreign debts (and indeed, on all foreign financial
investments in the country). This policy, termed the reserve requirement tax, w as in place from May
1992 to O ctober 1998. The required reserves held against foreign obligations (and payable by the
borrow er) w ere kept at the Central Bank for one year, regardless ofthe maturity ofthe obligation.
Authorities in Colombia also employed a reserve requirement tax specifically designed to
discourage domestic borrow ers from incurring foreign loans. Beginning in September 1993,
Colombian policymakers required that non-interest bearing reserves of47 per cent be held for one
year against foreign loans w ith maturities of18 months or less (this w as extended to loans w ith a
maturity ofup to five years in August 1994).18 In addition, foreign borrow ing related to real estate
transactions w as prohibited. Empirical studies ofChilean and Colombian policies conclude that
they achieved their principal objectives, including the reduction in foreign borrow ing [see Grabel,
2003a, and references therein].
To the extent that borrow ers assume at least some foreign loan obligations, it is imperative
that the allocation and terms ofthese loans be managed by the Government. Careful management
ofthe allocation offoreign debt can ensure that it is used for productive, developmental purposes.
Prior to financial liberalization in the 1990s, many governments in East and Southeast Asia tightly
coordinated allocation and access to foreign loans.
U ntil quite recently, policymakers in China and India maintained tight restrictions on foreign
borrow ing through a variety ofmeans [for details, see Epstein et al., 2004]. For example, Chinese
domestic firms w ere required to obtain government approval for any foreign loans undertaken.
The Indian Government maintained firm restrictions over the level and terms ofthe external debts
held by domestic firms. Responding to the lessons ofthe 1997 Asian crisis, India restricted
commercial borrow ing in foreign currencies. The Ministry ofFinance still maintains annual ceilings
on the size and interest rate on loans sought by domestic firms. The Ministry also rules on requests
for foreign loans on a case-by-case basis, basing its determinations on the maturity structure and
end-use ofthe proposed loans. In the approval process, priority is given to longer-term loans and
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loans for priority sectors. Firms in China and India have low levels ofexternal indebtedness and
external financial fragility precisely because ofgovernment policies tow ards external debt.
In general, policymakers should implement measures that restrict or otherw ise discourage
domestic borrow ers from using financing strategies that involve locational and maturity mismatch.
In addition to the ceilings, surcharges or approval processes discussed above, policymakers can
design trip w ires and speed bumps that keep the levels ofmaturity and/or locational mismatch
below the critical thresholds. A trip w ire for locational mismatch is the ratio offoreign-currency
denominated debt to domestic-currency denominated debt (w ith short-term obligations receiving
a greater w eight in the calculation). A trip w ire for maturity mismatch is the ratio ofshort-term debt
to long-term debt (w ith foreign-currency-denominated obligations receiving a greater w eight in
the calculation). A graduated series ofspeed bumps that require borrow ers to reduce their extent
oflocational or maturity mismatch w ould be implemented w henever trip w ires revealed the early
emergence ofthese vulnerabilities.
In those cases w here foreign loans have been significant, economic reforms that promote
grow th can replace the resources initially lost ifthere is a reduction in foreign borrow ing due to
the measures described above. Governments and central banks that take steps to restrict foreign
borrow ing can replace at least some ofthe finance that is foregone by implementing measures that
increase their ability to mobilize and channel domestic saving to projects that are central to a propoor grow th agenda. In this connection, measures that restrict the exit options ofdomestic savers
and businesses w ould increase the pool ofcapital available domestically (since much ofit is
presently lost to capital flight, see section 6.2 ofthis module).
The coordination ofindustrial policy and domestic financial regulation can also ensure that
domestic firms have access to capital that is generated domestically. Tax reform is yet another
means ofincreasing the domestic resource base. More generally, a multi-faceted pro-poor grow th
agenda w ill generate higher levels ofinvestment and economic grow th over time. Ifthis approach
is successful, the economy in the medium- to long-term w ill generate new domestic resources that
can be used to finance additional investment.

6.2 PO LICIES TO W ARD PO RTFO LIO IN VESTMEN T
Management ofportfolio investment (PI) w arrants serious consideration. Various types of
management techniques have contributed importantly to economic development in a range of
countries. Careful management ofPI can maximize the benefits and minimize the costs associated
w ith this resource. Many countries have successfully regulated PI for extended periods oftime. For
instance, during the tw o decades that follow ed W orld W ar II, all industrialized countries heavily
regulated PI inflow s and outflow s [H elleiner, 1994]. The only exception w as the U SA, but even it
resorted to temporary management ofPI for a short time in the 1960s w hen policymakers sought
to enhance confidence in the country’s faltering economy. Indeed, most Continental European
countries and Japan maintained stringent management ofportfolio and other capital flow s until
the mid-1980s.
The use ofcapital management techniques w as not confined to w ealthy countries.
Management ofPI w as the norm in developing countries until orthodoxy in economic policy
attained prominence. By any reasonable account, management ofportfolio and other capital flow s
contributed importantly to the success ofnumerous developing countries during the era oftheir
strongest economic performance, namely, the period betw een the 1950s and the mid-1970s.
Compared to the orthodox era, developing countries as a w hole w itnessed impressive economic
performance during the three decades that follow ed W orld W ar II, a time w hen capital
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management techniques w ere used w idely. Management ofcapital movements (in addition to
industrial and trade policy) contributed significantly to the strong economic performance ofmany
East and Southeast Asian countries during the 1970s and 1980s.
Some developing countries continue to use (or have recently used) techniques to manage PI
in the service ofimportant objectives. And even in the current climate, a few large developing
countries—some until quite recently—have effectively utilized techniques to manage PI inflow s
and outflow s. H ere, w e identify recent examples ofsuch strategies.
Malaysian authorities tw ice imposed restrictions over PI during the 1990s. The first such effort
w as in early 1994. At that time, the Malaysian economy received dramatic increases in the volume
ofprivate capital inflow s (including, but not limited to, PI). Policymakers w ere concerned that these
inflow s w ere feeding an unsustainable speculative boom in real estate and stock prices and w ere
creating pressures on the domestic currency. In this context, policymakers implemented stringent,
temporary inflow -capital management policies. These measures included restrictions on the
maintenance ofdomestic currency-denominated deposits and borrow ing by foreign banks,
management ofthe foreign exchange exposure ofdomestic banks and large firms, and
prohibitions on the sale to foreigners ofdomestic money market securities w ith a maturity ofless
than one year.
Reaction to these measures w as rapid and dramatic, so much so that authorities w ere able to
dismantle them as planned in under a year (since they achieved their goals during this time).
D uring the period that the capital management techniques w ere in place, the volume ofnet
private capital inflow s and short-term inflow s fell sharply, the composition ofthese flow s w as
altered significantly, pressure on the currency w as reduced, and the inflation ofstock and real
estate prices w as curtailed [Palma, 2000]. The immediate, pow erful reaction to these temporary
capital management policies underscores the potential ofspeed bumps to stem such incipient
difficulties successfully.
The Malaysian government again implemented stringent management ofcapital inflow s and
outflow s in 1998 during the East Asian financial crisis. This effort involved restrictions on foreign
access to the domestic currency, on international transfer and trading ofthe currency, and on the
convertibility ofcurrency held outside ofthe country. The Government also established a fixed
value for the domestic currency, closed the secondary market in equities, and prohibited nonresidents from selling local equities held for less than one year.
By numerous accounts, these stringent measures prevented the further financial implosion of
the country—a notable achievement since the country w as also gripped by a severe political and
social crisis during this time. Comparing the situation ofMalaysia to other countries that w ere
affected by the Asian crisis, studies find that the country’s capital management techniques w ere
responsible for the faster recovery ofits economy and stock market as w ell as the smaller
reductions in employment and w ages [Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001]. The latter achievements w ere
possible because capital management techniques provided the Government w ith the ability to
implement reflationary economic and social policies uninhibited by the threat ofadditional capital
flight or IMF disapproval.
From 1992 to 1998, policymakers in Chile and Colombia regulated PI extensively and
successfully. D uring that time, the Colombian Government did not allow foreign investors to
purchase debt instruments or corporate equity. This policy w as designed to prevent the possibility
that financial instability could be induced by the sudden exit offoreign investors from liquid
investment holdings. H ow ever, there w ere no significant capital management techniques that
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focused on FD I. The differential treatment ofFD I and PI w as intended to promote the type of
foreign investment that the Government deemed important to economic grow th, w hile protecting
the economy from destabilizing forms ofinvestment.
The Chilean Government had similar motivations for its policy tow ard foreign investment in
the country. By using the reserve requirement tax of30 per cent on foreign investment, the
government sought to lengthen the time horizon ofinvestment and encourage more stable forms
offoreign investment. FD I and PI faced a one-year residence requirement. The Government also
prevented pension fund managers from investing more than 12 per cent oftheir assets abroad.
This policy w as intended to curb the possibility ofcapital flight by the most important type oflarge
domestic investor.
N umerous empirical studies conclude that capital management techniques in Chile and
Colombia played a constructive role in changing the composition and maturity structure (though not
the volume) ofnet capital inflow s, particularly aftercapital management techniques w ere
strengthened in 1994-95 [see Grabel, 2003c, and references therein]. Follow ing implementation of
these policies in both countries, external financing in general moved from debt to FD I. Policymakers
in both Chile and Colombia w ere able to implement grow th-oriented policies because the risk of
foreign investorflight w as significantly curtailed by theircapital management techniques.
Finally, the macroeconomic stability fostered by these management techniques contributed
to the financial stability experienced by Chile and Colombia follow ing the Mexican and the Asian
financial crises. For instance, w hile other countries in Latin America w ere devastated by these
events (due to the exit ofinvestors from equity and government bond markets), Chile remained
largely stable and only began to experience a significant reduction in private capital inflow s in
August 1998.
In the case ofChina, up until the gradual move to liberalize international financial flow s that
began a few years ago, the participation offoreigners in equity markets w as limited very strictly,
and the activities ofits largely state-ow ned banks w ere circumscribed (e.g., lending to foreigners
for certain kinds ofprojects w as tightly regulated and access to foreign currency severely
restricted). Chinese residents also faced obstacles to capital expatriation. In fact, the Chinese
Government tightened restrictions and introduced new techniques to manage finance follow ing
the Asian crisis.
As the crisis unfolded, the Chinese Government announced new restrictions on foreign
exchange transactions involving more than U S$ 100,000, introduced new measures making it more
difficult for domestic and international companies to move money into and out ofthe country, and
introduced strict new penalties on Chinese companies that maintained illegal foreign currency
deposits overseas. Similarly, during the Asian financial crisis, authorities in Taiw an PO C also took
steps to prevent illegal trading offunds managed by George Soros (because these funds w ere
blamed for causing the local stock market to fall).
There is a strong case for restricting the access ofdomestic savers to foreign capital markets.
The flight ofdomestic investors can induce financial instability, as w ell as reduce the tax base and
the pool ofdomestic savings available for allocation by domestic financial institutions. For these
reasons, there is a strong case for restricting the ability ofdomestic investors to hold foreign
savings accounts and engage in capital flight.
In the mid-1980s, despite being the fourth largest foreign debtor in the w orld, the Republic
ofKorea w as saved from a debt crisis partly because ofstringent management ofcapital outflow s.
China and India provide more recent examples. China maintained firm restrictions on the ability
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ofdomestic investors to engage in foreign PI until a few years ago (by limiting their access to
foreign currencies in the first place). India, too, has been gradually loosening its traditionally firm
management ofinternational financial flow s over the last few years. Prior to liberalization, the exit
options ofdomestic investors w ere tightly restricted via limitations on their access to foreign
currency. Indian residents and firms w ere simply precluded from maintaining foreign currency
accounts abroad, w hile Indian banks could not accept deposits or extend loans in foreign
currencies. Recent studies have show n that the combined effects ofrestrictions on capital flight,
currency speculation and access to foreign currency and loans protected China and India from
instability during the Asian financial crisis.
The above discussion suggests that there are several directions for managing portfolio
investment (PI). The success ofblunt restrictions on PI in China, India, Chile and Colombia suggest
that foreign investors do not necessarily shun countries w ith minimum-stay requirements on
foreign investment or other types ofcapital management techniques. W e have also seen that the
tax system can be used to influence the composition and/or maturity structure ofinternational
capital flow s. The potential for flight by domestic investors and savers can be reduced via
implementation ofexit taxes, prohibitions on flight or restrictions on access to foreign currencies.
Finally, the Malaysian experience suggests that speed-bump style management ofPI can be
effective as w ell.
The trip w ire-speed bump approach lends itselfto the design oftemporary management ofPI.
A trip w ire that w ould reveal the vulnerability to the risk ofPI flight is the ratio oftotal accumulated
foreign PI to gross equity market capitalization or gross domestic capital formation. Ifthe trip w ire
revealed that a country w ere particularly vulnerable to the reversal ofPI inflow s, a graduated series
ofspeed bumps w ould slow the entrance ofnew inflow s until the ratio fell either because domestic
capital formation or gross equity market capitalization increased sufficiently or because foreign PI
fell. Thus, a speed bump on PI w ould slow unsustainable financing patterns until a larger
proportion ofany increase in investment could be financed domestically. W e emphasize the
importance ofspeed bumps governing inflow s ofPI because they exert their effects at times w hen
the economy is attractive to foreign investors;thus, they are not as likely to trigger investor panic as
are outflow restrictions. Although not a substitute for outflow management, inflow restrictions also
reduce the frequency, as w ell as the magnitude, w ith w hich the former must be used.

6.3 PO LICIES TO W ARD FD I
Because Foreign D irect Investment (FD I) is a type offinancial flow , it is highly relevant to a module
on financial policy. At the same time, FD I can also be more than a financial flow :it can arrive along
w ith a package oftechnology, access to international markets, and expertise in sales and
production. FD I can come in tw o general forms:as a so-called ‘Greenfield’ investment, w here new
plant and equipment are associated w ith FD I;or it can arrive as part ofa merger and acquisition
(M& A), w here a foreign investor buys more than 10 per cent ofthe equity ofa domestic firm
(a so-called ‘Brow nfield’ investment).
FD I is seen as a highly desirable form ofinternational investment by many developing
countries because governments often see it as:1) more stable than other flow s, 2) as a mechanism
for bringing a great deal ofnet capital into the country, 3) as a vehicle for bringing new technology
and expertise and 4) as a means for promoting integration w ith international markets.
In view ofthese perceived benefits, many developing countries are w illing to make significant
(and often costly) adjustments to domestic economic policy and institutions in order to attract FD I
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inflow s. A key question is w hether the benefits ofFD I inflow s offset the costs associated w ith the
policy and institutional changes that are often undertaken to attract them.
An extensive literature has assessed the impacts ofFD I on developing countries. Most ofit
finds that the positive impacts are, in general, smaller than many developing country governments
believe (H anson, 2001;U N CTAD , 2000). In most cases, there are modest degrees oftechnology and
skill transfer;limited degrees ofemployment generation;limited net inflow s ofcapital due to
domestic sourcing offunds and profit remittances;and limited linkages to the domestic economy
(this is reflected in modest increases in value added in production). Some evidence also suggests
that FD I flow s are not significantly more stable than portfolio flow s. Finally, as discussed in section
2.3, most countries, no matter how hard they try, can attract only very limited amounts ofFD I,
especially since most ofit flow s to a relatively small number ofdeveloping countries.
Still, under the right circumstances and w ith the appropriate institutional structures, FD I
inflow s can contribute to development. An examination ofhistorical experiences suggests the w ays
in w hich FD I as a financial inflow can be managed in a development friendly manner. (See Box 6).
BO X 6

A D evelopm entalA pproach to FD I
Some countries, especially in East Asia, offer particularly good recent examples ofstrategies for maximizing the
developmental benefits ofFD I. Even more recently, China, India and Vietnam have adopted highly strategic
attitudes tow ard FD I (rather than the ‘open door’ policy in place in so many countries). The experience ofthis
latter group ofcountries demonstrates that foreign investors w ill not necessarily shun countries that apply capital
management techniques to FD I. Indeed, evidence also show s that w hen deciding w here to channel their
resources, foreign investors place more emphasis on a large domestic market, an educated w orkforce, rising
incomes, economic grow th and sound infrastructure than on a liberal regulatory regime. Thus, policymakers in
developing countries have no reason to think that low w ages and lax regulation are appropriate strategies for
attracting FD I.
FD I policy stands the best chance ofcontributing to pro-poor grow th objectives ifpolicymakers develop a
clear vision as to how it contributes to the country’s overall macroeconomic aims. Countries such as Republic of
Korea and Taiw an PO C are know n to have used strict regulation on FD I in most industries, w hile also taking a very
liberal attitude tow ards FD I in others. This mixture ofrestrictive and liberal policies w as possible because the
Governments developed a clear FD I strategy that differentiated industries. The recent experiences ofSingapore
and Costa Rica show that policymakers can target the attraction ofparticular types ofFD I (or even target particular
firms) as a central part oftheir overall economic strategy. For example, the potential ofdifferent types ofFD I might
be gauged according to their employment multiplier.

The precise strategy tow ard FD I taken in any particular country should depend on the nature
ofthe FD I that is being sought, the country’s endow ments, and the grow th and poverty-reduction
objectives ofthe Government. Some countries, especially the poorest ones, may have narrow goals
for FD I, seeking only an infusion offoreign capital that w ill increase employment (under any terms),
reduce poverty and attract foreign exchange. The industries for garments, shoes and toys often
function in this limited, but in some cases, economically important capacity.
In such cases, it may be acceptable—or even important—that the country remain open to
FD I because the industries are seen strictly as a strategic means to attract foreign capital in the
short run. Many countries have established export processing zones for the purpose ofattracting
FD I to these types ofindustries. H ow ever, it should be noted that the types ofindustries that tend
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to populate export-processing zones are often developmental dead ends in the long run.
Therefore, policymakers need to devise a strategy to reinvest the export earnings generated
by such industries in order to generate new industrial capabilities.
In some countries and in some industries, the Government may find it necessary to induce
foreign investors to undertake expensive investments in capital equipment and technology. These
types offoreign investments can sometimes be a precondition for using the country’s natural
resources to some advantage because the technology or finance necessary to exploit or extract
natural (e.g., mineral) resources is not alw ays available domestically. In this context, it may be
necessary to adopt an FD I strategy for a sector that is attractive to foreign investors, but allow s
the host country to extract the largest possible ‘rent’ from their ow n natural resources. Carefully
structured joint-operating agreements have w orked w ell in some countries.
In some cases, the Government may seek to promote certain industries as part ofan industrial
policy aimed at creating long-run international competitiveness in some realm. At the early stages,
this might necessitate a major injection ofnew technology and capital, a circumstance that
necessitates the participation offoreign firms. In this type ofsituation, it is important for the
national government to negotiate w ith foreign firms over technology transfer and prevent these
firms from imposing restrictions on exports and R& D . These matters w ere w ell negotiated in the
cases ofthe Chinese auto industry and the Korean fast train project in the mid-1990s.
Finally, in those cases in w hich the country is reasonably close to achieving international
competitiveness in a particular industry, it may be necessary to exclude foreign firms altogether.
This is especially important w here the domestic market is small. This restriction may be necessary
so that local firms have the greatest possible opportunity to develop their competitive advantage.
The main point is that there is no single appropriate strategy for all types ofFD I and for all
types ofcountries. Policies tow ards FD I must be tailored to the particular conditions ofeach
industry and each country. And, as w ith other types ofcapital flow s, management ofFD I must be
dynamic so that policy evolves as internal and external conditions change.

6.4 PO LICIES TO W ARD PRIVATE REMITTAN CES
Researchers have only recently begun to examine the contribution ofremittances to economic
grow th, investment, household consumption and poverty reduction. Indeed, Solimano [2003]is
one ofthe only studies that address these macroeconomic issues in a preliminary fashion. Rempell
[2005]considers these issues in the Mexican context. At this point, there is a great deal more
empirical w ork to be done, particularly w ith regard to how recipients use these funds (i.e., w hether
they smooth consumption or promote investment) and w hether they substitute for or complement
savings by recipients.
There is reason to consider mechanisms that reduce the cost ofsending and receiving
remittances in order to increase the size ofthe potential remittance pool. It is also important to
increase the ability ofthe domestic banking system in recipient countries to mobilize these funds in
accordance w ith a pro-poor grow th agenda. Some ofthe initiatives discussed in section 4.2 may be
useful in the latter connection.
Solimano [2003]argues that on the sending-country side, banks should be encouraged to
develop new low -cost product lines for migrants, such as special checking, savings or ATM
accounts. O n the recipient country side, he suggests several strategies. For example,
governments and local financial institutions can issue interest-bearing bonds for emigrants as a
vehicle for channelling remittances;housing and education accounts can be created to channel
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remittances to these activities in the home country;and alliances can be created betw een
domestic banks in the receiving countries and banks in the sending countries w ith the goal
ofreducing the costs ofremittances.
Rempell’s [2005]w ork on remittances to Mexico has relevance beyond the country. H e
proposes the creation ofopportunities for migrant w orkers to remit their earnings into foreign
currency accounts in domestic banks. H e acknow ledges that this measure alone might not reduce
the cost ofremittances in rural areas since large banks rarely have a presence outside ofthe cities.
For that reason, he suggests that microfinance institutions should become eligible to receive
international transfers. H e also describes an innovative program in the Mexican state ofZacateca
that is designed to leverage the developmental potential ofremittances. Beginning in 1992, the
local government began to match (initially at a tw o-for-one, and now at a three-for-one, rate)
monies that w ere sent to the state by ‘home tow n associations’ ofmigrants living in the U .S.A..

6.5 A BRIEF D ISCU SSIO N O F TH E CO MPLEMEN TARITY BETW EEN TH E MAN AGEMEN T
O F EXCH AN GE RATES AN D IN TERN ATIO N AL CAPITAL FLO W S
As noted in the introduction to this section, a discussion ofstrategies tow ard the exchange rate is
outside the scope ofthis module.19 There may be good reasons (indeed, very good reasons) for
countries to pursue diverse types ofmanaged exchange rate regimes, such as craw ling or
adjustable currency pegs. These approaches have played important roles in promoting
industrialization, export and employment grow th and financial stability in many countries in the
post-W W II period and in the recent era [see discussion in Chang and Grabel, 2004, ch. 11;
W illiamson, 2002].
For the purposes ofthis module, w e simply note that managed exchange rate regimes ofany
type are sustainable only ifsupported by techniques to manage international capital flow s. This is
because high volumes ofinternational capital inflow s or outflow s make it difficult for authorities to
maintain any type ofcurrency peg w ithin a pre-determined range. Absent the ability to maintain
the exchange rate w ithin a pre-determined range, the best laid plans to promote export,
employment and/or pro-poor grow th and macroeconomic stability w ill be compromised.
Moreover, authorities w ill need to maintain extremely large holdings offoreign exchange reserves
in order to protect the currency from a speculative attack—a circumstance that carries w ith it large
opportunity costs.

7 CO N CLU SIO N S
W e have argued that the financial landscape in developing countries faces serious challenges
involving excessively high real interest rates, low levels ofcredit creation, and a dearth oflongterm, ‘patient’ capital and capital for small- and medium-sized enterprises and poor households.
The global financial landscape is also inadequate to the task ofpromoting pro-poor grow th in the
developing w orld. Globally, financial markets are characterized by a misallocation ofsavings and by
the pro-cyclical nature ofcredit and capital flow s.
W e have also argued that the policies offinancial liberalization that have been pursued in
many developing countries over the last quarter century have exacerbated the challenges facing
them. In particular, financial liberalization has often led to greater inequality and to a stagnation
ofincomes and employment opportunities for the poor.
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The main contribution ofthis Training Module on Financial Policy has notbeen to demonstrate
the inadequacy ofthe developing-country or the global financial landscape. Rather, the chief
contribution ofthis w ork has been to demonstrate that there exists a w ide range ofstrategies that
financial policymakers in developing countries can use to promote pro-poor grow th. O fcourse,
financial polices alone are not a panacea for the poverty that plagues the developing w orld.
Moreover, the challenges associated w ith significant financial reform cannot be ignored. H ow ever,
it is imperative that w e recognize that properly formulated and nationally specific financial policies
can play an important role in providing finance for employment and in building assets by the poor,
can help stabilize the macro-economy, and can enhance the economic and social pow er ofthe
poor in the developing w orld.
W e have argued that the financial sector has numerous important roles to play in promoting
pro-poor grow th. It can:
•

Mobilize savings that can be used for productive investment and employment
generation;

•

Create credit for employment generation and poverty reduction at modest and stable
real interest rates;

•

Allocate credit for employment generation and help the poor to build assets, including
in agriculture, small- and medium-sized enterprises and housing;

•

Provide patient (long-term) credit for productivity-enhancing innovation and
investment;

•

Provide financing for public investment to promote employment generation and
productivity enhancement;

•

H elp allocate risks to those w ho can most easily and efficiently bear them;

•

H elp stabilize the economy by reducing vulnerability to financial crises and pro-cyclical
movements in finance, and by helping maintain moderate rates ofinflation;

•

H elp the poor by providing basic financial and banking services.

W e have show n that there exist diverse types offinancial policies and institutions that can play
a useful role in promoting pro-poor grow th in developing countries. In this module, w e have
described a large number ofprinciples, policies and institutions—from earlier historical eras and
from the current period that can and have promoted pro poor grow th. W e have also described a
number ofmore innovative policies that w e believe w arrant consideration by today’s policymakers.
W e have found that pro-poor financial policies have tended to be the most successful w hen
they satisfied several conditions:
•

They have had strong monitoring mechanisms in place to increase the likelihood that
they could achieve their goals.

•

They have operated in a context ofrobust aggregate demand so that there has been a
facilitating environment for economic grow th.

•

They have also operated in a domestic and international environment in w hich there
has not been a large degree ofinstability.

•

They have been part ofa coherent overall developmental plan implemented by
the government.
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The main policy lessons ofthis Training Module are that:1) countries should not become
excessively reliant on private foreign capital to fund their development since such capital can be
unstable and unreliable;2) market allocation offinance needs to be embedded in strong financial
regulations often supplemented by an important role for government guidance offinance to
important sectors;3) there is a large variety ofsuccessful w ays to use the financial system to
mobilize and direct finance that make a judicious use ofmarket incentives, government guarantees
and monitoring to ensure that the finance goes to socially productive purposes 4) central banks,
along w ith other public financial institutions, need to be involved in promoting a developmental
role for finance;and 5) capital management techniques, usually ofa dynamic and flexible nature,
can be a very important tool for reducing the negative aspects ofglobal financial integration w hile
enhancing the positive aspects.
The overriding message ofthis module is that there exists a w ide range offinancial policies
and experiences that policymakers can draw upon and adapt in accordance w ith their national
pro-poor grow th objectives.
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[1995]and section 2.2 ofGrabel [2003a].
3. All data in this and the next paragraph from W orld Bank [2005].
4. This section draw s on McKinley [2006a].
5. The discussion in sections 4.2.-4.4 and 4.6 draw s heavily on Chang and Grabel [2004:ch. 10], except w here noted.
6. D iscussion ofIndia, Pakistan and N epal from Pickbourn [2006:10].
7. N ote that w e discuss microfinance institutions, MFIs, briefly in section 4.10.
8. Public investment as a share ofgross domestic investment in the post-w ar period ranged from a high of58 per cent in
Mexico to a low of25 per cent in Brazil (ibid., p. 127).
9. Proposal and text from Epstein and H eintz [2006].
10. W e are grateful to Lynda Pickbourn for critical research support on mechanisms to forge linkages betw een formal and
informal financial institutions and on Gallardo’s [2001]w ork on microfinance institutions.
11. Proposal and text from Epstein and H eintz [2006].
12. The description in this and the next paragraph is draw n from Pickbourn [2006].
13. A key determinant ofthe impact ofinflation on economic grow th and distribution, and on the cost ofreducing
inflation is the causes of inflation in any particular episode. Ifinflation is due to increases in aggregate demand, then
the impact on economic grow th and the w ell-being ofthe poor is likely to be less harmful (and even can be positive)
than ifthe cause ofinflation increases is ‘supply-shocks’. H ence, an analysis ofthe ‘optimal’ level ofinflation and the
proper monetary policy response must include, among other factors, an identification ofthe causes ofinflation.
(Pollin and Zhu, 2006).
14. Saez [2004]is an important source for the material in this section.
15. This section draw s heavily on N embhard, 1996, and Maxfield, 1994, 1997.
16. N ote that sections 6.1-6.3 and 6.5 draw heavily on Chang and Grabel [2004:ch. 9, 11]except w here noted.
17. Maturity mismatch occurs w hen borrow ers finance long-term obligations w ith short-term credit, leaving them
vulnerable to changes in the supply and cost of credit. Locational mismatch occurs w hen borrow ers contract debts
that are repayable in foreign currency, leaving them vulnerable to currency depreciation that increases the cost of
debt service.
18. N ote that the level, scope and method of paying the reserve requirement tax w as, in fact, changed many times
during the lifespan of the policy regime in both C hile and C olombia. See Grabel [2003a] for details and Epstein,
Grabel and Jomo [2004].
19. See Chang and Grabel [2004:ch. 11]for discussion ofexchange rate policy.
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